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The Ebola outbreak in West Africa that started in December 2013 has sickened more than 
25,000 people and taken more than 10,000 lives, making it the largest Ebola outbreak 
ever recorded. A review of the chronology of transmission of disease in Guinea, Liberia, 
and Siera Leone juxtaposed with the containment eforts of the Ministers of Health, The 
World Health Organization and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reveal fissures in the 
response of the global community contributed to the spread of the disease. Ebola failed 
to be contained quickly because there was: a lack of an coordinated and robust 
containment program, an inherent distrust in the government and their ancilary Ebola 
warnings, widespread fear of Ebola Treatment Centers and subsequent hiding of patients, 
a highly mobile population, the appearance of the disease in urban centers. While the 
disease has caused widespread morbidity and mortality and destroyed communities and 
the health care infrastructure, Ebola has given the global health community the 
opportunity to rebuild health systems and test experimental therapies that can prevent 
future epidemics from causing widespread devastation and loss of life.  
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Background (1) 
 
On December 2, 2013, in Gueckedou, a city of approximately 250,000 people in southern 
Guinea, a two-year old boy from the Meliandou Vilage came down with what was 
probably assumed to be cholera or Lassa fever (4). He exhibited classic symptoms of 
both diseases: he had a fever, he was vomiting and he had diarhea. To the best of 
anyone’s knowledge, no outside care was sought on his behalf and he was most likely 
cared for by his mother at home. On December 6, 2013, a mere four days after he first 
showed symptoms, the boy died. 
Ten days later, the litle boy’s mother was dead; two weeks after that his sister 
and his grandmother had both died. Al three exhibited the same symptoms as the two-
year old boy: vomiting, black diarhea and fever, al of which came on only a few days 
prior to their deaths. By the end of December, the entire family, save the father, was 
gone. The cause of death was never definitively ascertained, but whatever it was, it was 
kiling its victims rapidly. 
One month after the two-year old’s family was wiped out, a nurse and midwife 
from Meliandou also developed the exact same symptoms and both died. It is unknown 
how they contracted the disease, although they have been linked to both the boy’s sister 
and grandmother: it is assumed that they were the caregivers to both. This is a plausible 
explanation considering that after the mother of the boy died, there was no one else to 
look after them as they lay dying, so the vilage caregivers stepped in. 
 The disease did not stay confined to this one vilage for long. In Dawa Vilage, 
also in the city Gueckedou, the grandmother’s sister and at least two other women 
became il a few weeks after they atended the grandmother’s funeral. Al three of these 
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new cases had symptoms consistent with Ebola and they died five to six days after they 
fel il. It is hypothesized that they became infected at the grandmother’s funeral, where 
ritual washing, touching and kissing of the corpse are common traditional burial practices 
(2). In addition to these three cases, it is thought that up to eight people in Dawa died 
through exposure at the grandmother’s funeral. There were also 14 more deaths in the 
Baladou District of Gueckedou, al of which were possibly linked to contact with the 
women who atended the funeral. 
The disease left Meliandou vilage through another route as wel. The midwife, 
who is thought to have cared for the family of the index case back in December, was 
herself cared for by a member of her own family, who lived in nearby Dandou Pombo 
Vilage, also in the city of Gueckedou. One of the midwife’s family members became 
infected while caring for her and took the disease back home to Dandou where it spread 
to six other people, al of whom later died. The midwife is also suspected of transmiting 
disease to acquaintances who lived in the Ghandou Vilage of Gueckedou where three 
deaths occured. 
Although the midwife was initialy cared for by family members at home, she did 
seek professional medical care. She was admited into Gueckedou Hospital, a 
government-run facility in the heart of the city. She was initialy diagnosed with cholera 
(3); as a result unsuspecting staf had unprotected contact with her bodily fluids through 
the course of treatment. The midwife died in the hospital on February 10, 2014, but not 
before she infected at least one health care worker who was employed there.  
When this heath care worker became il, she was treated at Macenta Hospital, in 
Macenta, Guinea, a city 89.5 km (55 miles) to the east of Gueckedou, where she died on 
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February 19, 2014. During her course of treatment at the hospital, she infected her mother 
in law who lived in the Farako District of Gueckendou, as wel as the doctor who was 
caring for her in the hospital. It is unknown how many other nosocomial transmissions 
occured at Macenta Hospital from this one infected health care worker from Gueckedou 
Hospital, but at least 15 people, from the middle of February to the end of March, are 
thought to have been infected by her and died.  
The doctor who treated the health care worker in Macenta Hospital transmited 
the disease to a person who had contact with him at some point while he was infectious. 
It is unclear if this was a hospital worker, family member or friend. Nonetheless, this 
infected person transmited the disease to two people in his own family (both of whom 
died by the middle of March) as wel as another one of his family members who lived in 
Nzerekore, a city 84 miles south of Macenta. This family member died in Nzerekore on 
February 28, 2014. The deceased family member transmited the virus to a friend, who 
was hospitalized in Macenta, but died in Nzerekore on March 16, 2014. Finaly, the 
Doctor also transmited the disease to two of his brothers, both of whom died in the first 
week of March, in the city of Kissidougou, a city 134 km North of Macenta. See Figures 
One and Two for a map of the region and a flow chart of transmission paterns. 
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Source: htp:/www.nejm.org/doi/ful/10.1056/NEJMoa1404505 
 
Figure  One: (1) Map  of  Guinea that  highlights the  main cites 
involved at the  beginning  of the West  African  Ebola  Outbreak  of 
2014.  The  outbreak  began in a  vilage located  within the city  of 
Gueckedou, located where the borders of Guinea, Liberia and Siera 
Leone converge. This area is  highly traficked  by foot and by car, 
and the  borders are relatively  porous, alowing for  unfetered 
movement amongst the three countries (4). Families travel back and 
forth for commercial  purposes and to shop at  markets (5). 
Gueckedou in particular is known for its weekly market that atracts 
traders from neighboring countries (107). People also cross borders 
for personal reasons, to atend funerals and family gatherings (218). 
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Figure Two (1) Transmission Chains of laboratory confirmed cases in 
Guinea. Dashed arrows indicate presumed links. Laboratory-confirmed cases 
are shown in red circles; suspected cases (S) are identified by case number.  
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And so the West Africa Ebola Epidemic of 2014 began. On March 10 2014, three 
months after the index case died, local public health oficials in Gueckedou and Macenta 
alerted the Ministry of Health in Guinea and Medicins sans Frontieres (Doctors Without 
Borders) who already had a team on the ground that was working in Gueckedou on a 
malaria project (3; 208) about this mysterious disease characterized by fever, vomiting 
and diarhea (1; 2; 3). On March 14 a health ministry team was sent to Gueckendou to 
investigate. Medicins sans Frontieres (MSF) also sent a team that arived on March 18. 
Within a fortnight, BSL4 laboratories in Lyon, France and Hamburg, Germany identified 
the causative agent as Zaire Ebolavirus. On March 23, 2014, the World Health 
Organization in Geneva was oficialy notified of the outbreak (1). 
Although the disease percolated in the remote forested regions of Guinea for the 
first few months of 2014, it did not take long for the virus to find its way into urban areas. 
On approximately March 31, 2014 the first Ebola cases were recorded in Conkary, the 
capital of Guinea, home to approximately two milion people (210; 211). By this time 
there were also 80 suspected cases and 59 deaths in Gueckedou; 23 suspected cases and 
15 deaths in Macenta; and eight suspected cases and five deaths in Kissidougou (7). 
Despite MSF warnings during the late winter and and early spring of 2014 that the 
epidemic was “of a magnitude never before seen in terms of the distribution of cases in 
the country,” (7) it wasn’t until July 22, 2014 that Dr. Louis Sambo, the Regional 
Director of the WHO West African Ofice visited the afected regions (8; 152). By this 
time, there were 415 cases and 314 deaths in Guinea; 224 cases and 127 deaths in 
Liberia; 454 cases and 219 deaths in Siera Leone; for a total of 1093 cases and 660 
deaths across the region (8). 
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 On August 8, 2014, eight months after the epidemic began, after 961 people had 
died and 1779 cases were recorded (160), the WHO finaly declared the epidemic to be a 
“public health emergency of international concern” (9). 
The 2014 Ebola outbreak is unprecedented in terms of its scope and size. It has 
lasted longer than al other previous outbreaks, and is the largest Ebola outbreak ever 
recorded. What started as a handful of cases in rural southeastern Guinea eventualy 
spread to urban centers and capital cities in Siera Leone, Liberia, Senegal, Nigeria and 
Mali. As of March 25, 2015, one year after the outbreak began, there have been 24,907 
suspected and probable cases and 10,326 confirmed deaths (103). The causative agent in 
this curent outbreak has been identified as the Zaire Ebolavirus, which marks not only 
the first time that this strain has been seen outside of Equatorial Africa, (10) but also the 
first time the virus has been found in densely populated urban areas, a fact that has 
contributed to its unprecedented spread (5). 
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Focus of thesis 
There are many worthwhile aspects of the West African Ebola outbreak that wil warant 
examination and study in the months and years to come. Retrospective analysis of the 
behaviors of the initial case(s) wil be analyzed and deconstructed in an efort to 
determine the zoonotic reservoir of Zaire Ebolavirus and the primary spilover event that 
started the outbreak (123). Scrutiny of how the cases have been clustered in terms of time 
and space wil uncover the reasons behind the breadth and depth of human-to-human 
transmission. Sociological and Anthropological queries wil concern the cultural factors, 
mores, political paradigms and infrastructure fissures that may have contributed to the 
unparaleled spread of the virus. The size of the outbreak has given the medical 
community and molecular biologists a unique opportunity to test experimental drugs, 
treatments and vaccines in the field, which has heretofore not been possible in an Ebola 
outbreak (62). They wil closely examine the human immune response; the results can 
guide the direction of future research and drug development (30). Bioethicists wil 
debate the merits and disadvantages of testing drugs in randomized clinical trials in the 
midst of a deadly outbreak. (11; 12; 13; 17) Questions surounding who wil and who wil 
not receive the limited number of experimental anti-viral medications wil be considered 
(14). Evidence from treating patients in the field can clarify best practices and frame 
future treatment protocols (55; 56; 57). Epidemiologists wil calculate and study the Case 
Fatality Rate, Reproductive Number, statisticaly significant risk factors of death (139; 
180). Analysis of this outbreak response wil provide opportunities to improve future 
prevention and control. 
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 For the purposes of this thesis, I wil review the pathogenesis and molecular 
biology of the virus, immunological responses in humans to Ebola, transmission paterns, 
clinical manifestations of disease, the biological diferences and markers that exist 
between survivors and those who succumb to Ebola infections; the suspected zoonotic 
reservoir; existing and novel treatments and vaccines; and finaly the natural history of 
Ebolavirus outbreaks. 
With respect to the 2014 Ebola outbreak, I wil discuss the paterns of 
transmission and the cultural, political and human capital factors that may have 
contributed to the magnitude of the spread of the disease. However, my main concern 
rests with future programs and protocols that can be implemented to prevent an outbreak 
of this level in the future. 
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Methods 
 
This thesis is a literature review of the history of the Ebola Virus and a summary of the 
2014 Outbreak. Material and sources used with respect to past outbreaks, molecular 
biology, pathogenesis, immune responses, transmission, clinical presentation, curent 
treatment protocols and the natural history of Ebola outbreaks came from peer-reviewed 
journals, al of which are listed in the Bibliography. Information on experimental 
vaccines and treatments was found from the manufacturers of the drugs themselves or 
from respected periodicals such as the New York Times and The Wal Street Journal. Al 
data on the curent Ebola epidemic in West Africa was culed primarily from the bi-
weekly WHO Situation Reports, Doctors Without Borders Updates and UNMEER 
Situation Reports.  
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Filovirus Genera and Strains 
The Ebola Virus genera belongs to the Filoviradae family of viruses in the 
Mononegavirales order (See Figure Three) (16). Al Filoviruses encode their genome in a 
single stranded negative sense RNA and are known to cause disease in humans and non-
human primates. In addition to Ebolavirus, the Filoviridae family also includes the 
Marburgvirus and Cuevavirus genera as members. While Marburg and Cuevaviruses only 
have one species or strain, Ebolavirus has five: Bundibugyo, Reston, Sudan, Tai Forest 
and Zaire. The Reston strain is non-pathogenic in humans, but does cause disease in 
monkeys and pigs. 
Marburg virus was the first genera of the Filoviridae family to be discovered 
(104). In 1967, there were simultaneous outbreaks in Marburg, Germany; Frankfurt, 
Germany; and Belgrade, Yugoslavia. The epidemic began when laboratory workers in al 
three cities were initialy exposed to the Marburg infected tissues and blood from African 
green monkeys that had been imported from Uganda. The virus spread via nosocomial 
transmission and to household contacts of lab workers. By the end of the outbreak, 31 
people were infected and seven people died. Since 1967, there have been 12 cases and/or 
isolated outbreaks of the Marburgvirus, most of which have occured in the central region 
of Africa, namely the nations of Gabon, Uganda, the DRC and South Sudan.  
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The Zaire and Sudan Ebolavirus strains were discovered in 1976 in Central Africa 
during two simultaneous outbreaks, both of which will be described in detail below. 
A third Ebola Strain, Cote d’Ivoire (now known as the Tai Forest strain) was 
discovered in 1994 when an ethnologist was infected while performing a necropsy on a 
diseased chimpanzee. There was only one patient involved, the ethnologist, and she 
survived the infection. There have been no known cases involving this strain since. (97; 
1) 
The Bundibugyo strain was discovered in 2007 in the Bundibugyo district in 
Uganda. While the details involving the primary patient and the primary spilover event 
are scant, it is known that secondary transmissions occured via close human contact. 149 
people were infected in the outbreak and 37 people died, resulting in a Case Fatality Rate 
of 25%. (18). There has only been one other outbreak of the Bundibugyo recorded since, 
which occured in 2012 in the Democratic Republic of Congo when 77 people were 
infected and 36 died (CFR of 47%) (105). 
The fifth subtype (Reston) was discovered in 1989 in Reston, Virginia when 
scientists were investigating an outbreak of what was thought to be Simian Hemorhagic 
Fever in Cynomolgus Macaques (187). Instead, they found that the monkeys were 
infected with a novel strain of Ebolavirus. It was suspected that the monkeys were 
exposed to this new strain of Ebolavirus while in transit to the United States from the 
Philippines. This strain has only been shown to cause disease in non-human primates; it 
has not exhibited pathogenic tendencies in humans.  
The Cuevaviridae genera, and its sole member, Lloviuvirus, was discovered in 
2002 when a team of scientists investigated a massive bat die-of in French, Spanish and 
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Portuguese caves (17). Initialy suspecting pneumonia, the team instead discovered 
sequences of a unique member of the Filoviridae family in the spleen, liver and lung 
samples of dead M. schreibersi bats. They placed the novel virus in new genera 
Cuevaviridae, which is named for cueva, the Spanish word for cave. The strain itself, 
Lloviuvirus, was named after the Lloviu cave, where the virus was found. Interestingly, 
the virus sequences that were isolated in dead bats were missing in live bats of the same 
species, suggesting that Lloviuvirus infection may be pathogenic in bats. This would 
separate Lluoviuvirus from other Filoviridae species. Bats are thought to be the natural 
reservoir for the Ebolavirus and Marburgvirus strains and by definition they do not 
succumb to the disease even though they are infected and shed virus. While a bat natural 
reservoir had definitively been determined for Marburg virus, proving that bats are also 
the natural reservoir for Ebolavirus has proved elusive. 
Sine the discovery of the Ebolavirus strain, there have been 13 occurences of 
Zaire Ebolavirus strain, seven of Sudan Ebolavirus, two of the Bundibugyo and one of 
the Tai Forest. Of these, 19 can be considered outbreaks, not including the 2014 
Outbreak in West Africa. See Table One. (18; 122). 
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Country Town Cases Deaths Species Year 
Uganda Luwero District 6 3 Sudan ebolavirus 2012 
Dem. Rep. of Congo Isiro Health Zone 36 13 Bundibugyo 
ebolavirus 
2012 
Uganda Kibaale District 11 4 Sudan ebolavirus 2012 
Uganda Luwero District 1 1 Sudan ebolavirus 2011 
Dem. Rep. of Congo Luebo 32 15 Zaire ebolavirus 2008 
Uganda Bundibugyo 149 37 Bundibugyo 
ebolavirus 
2007 
Dem. Rep. of Congo Luebo 264 187 Zaire ebolavirus 2007 
South Sudan Yambio 17 7 Sudan ebolavirus 2004 
Republic of Congo Mbanza 35 29 Zaire ebolavirus 2003 
Republic of Congo Mbomo 143 128 Zaire ebolavirus 2002 
Republic of Congo Oloba 57 43 Zaire ebolavirus 2001 
Gabon Mekambo 65 53 Zaire ebolavirus 2001 
Uganda Gulu 425 224 Sudan ebolavirus 2000 
South Africa Johannesburg 2 1 Zaire ebolavirus 1996 
Gabon Booue 60 45 Zaire ebolavirus 1996 
Gabon Mayibout 37 21 Zaire ebolavirus 1996 
Dem. Rep. of Congo Kikwit 315 250 Zaire ebolavirus 1995 
Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) Tai Forest 1 0 Taï Forest 
ebolavirus 
1994 
Gabon Mekouka 52 31 Zaire ebolavirus 1994 
South Sudan Nzara 34 22 Sudan ebolavirus 1979 
Dem. Rep. of Congo Tandala 1 1 Zaire ebolavirus 1977 
Sudan Nzara 284 151 Sudan ebolavirus 1976 
Dem. Rep. of Congo Yambuku 318 280 Zaire ebolavirus 1976 
 
     Source: htp:/www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/history/chronology.html 
  
Table One (18; 122) Manifestations of Ebola Virus Disease in Africa.  
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Ebola Virus Molecular Biology  
 
Ebolavirus is an enveloped, non-segmented virus that encodes its genome in a single 
stranded, negative sense RNA (16). It appears long and filamentous under the electron 
microscope, which helped give rise to the Filoviridae name. Ebola has a uniform 
diameter of 80 nm its length can reach 14000 nanometers. Its seven genes encode eight 
proteins, which are aranged in a linear order. Short nontranscribed regions are located at 
the extreme 3’ and 5’ ends, caled the leader and the trailer, respectively. The structural 
proteins are aranged as folows (See Figure Four): nucleoprotein (NP), virion protein 
(VP) 35, VP 40, Glycoprotein (GP), VP 30, VP 24, and an RNA dependent polymerase 
(L). Al encode for one structural protein, with the exception of GP, which also produces 
a soluble protein, sGP, which is secreted into the bloodstream from infected cels. This 
soluble glycoprotein is distinctive to the Ebolavirus genera, as no other virus in the 
Mononegavirales order produces a soluble protein from its genome.  
Each of the proteins in the Ebola genome multitask, making Ebola incredibly 
eficient. VP24, VP35 and NP work together to form nucleocapsid structures (23); NP 
and VP30 are responsible for capsid assembly and binding viral RNA (19); VP30, VP35, 
NP and L are involved in transcription and replication of the genome (22); L, VP40 and 
VP35 mediate assembly of new virions (22); VP40 and VP24 direct virus budding (19). 
The genes also functional individualy: VP35 and VP24 act as interferon antagonists (16), 
which create an environment conducive for unrestricted viral multiplication; V4P40 is the 
main protein involved in particle formation and maintaining structural integrity of the 
virion (19; 16; 23) and GP mediates entry into host cels (19). The role of sGP is 
unknown, but it is thought that it might act as a decoy for antibody surveilance in the 
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blood, distracting the immune system while the real virus infects cels and replicates (20; 
21). The genome of the virus and its RNA are encapsulated inside the lipid bilayer 
envelope, which originates from the host cel membrane that protects the viral genome 
and facilitates entry into host cels (32). 
 
       
 Source: htps:/www.askscientific.com/ebola-virus-life-cycle-and-pathogenicity-in-humans/ 
 





GP, the trimeric-spiked main surface protein embedded in the bilayer of the virus, 
is responsible for binding to host cels and mediating fusion between the viral envelope 
and the host cel membrane (21). It is formed by two parts: GP1 and GP2 (16). GP1 
forms the trimeric spikes that are visible on the exterior of an Ebolavirus (see Figure Five 
and Six) and are heavily glycosylated. The receptor-binding site on GP1 that is 
imperative for atachment and entry into host cels, and the actual target of neutralizing 
Figure Four: Cartoon of the Ebolavirus Genome (top) and an 
Electron micrograph (botom) of the virus. 
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antibody, is hidden underneath the glycan caps. These binding sites are only revealed 
when GP1 is cleaved after it enters the endosomal compartment of the host cel (22). GP2 
is tasked with fusing with host cel membranes and initiating entry into the cytoplasm of 
the cel. The structure of GP, and the sequestering of the antibody binding site, ensures 
that antibody surveilance of the host immune system is not the same as antibody receptor 
binding, a trait that is thought to contribute to immune system evasion (23). 
 




Figure Five: The three GP1 subunits (blue and 
green) are tied together by three GP2 subunits 
(white). GP1 mediates atachment between the 
receptor binding sites that are located 
underneath GP1 and host cel endosomal 
membranes. GP2 alows fusions of the viral 
membrane with the host cel.  
 







Figure Six: The Ebola Virion 
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Ebola Pathogenesis  
Scientists have not yet determined the essential surface protein on host cels that 
Ebolavirus targets and ataches to, but it is known that dendritic cels are one of the first 
cels to be atacked in an Ebola infection (26). It has been speculated that Ebola gains 
entry into cels by producing an increased amount of phosphatidylserine, a lipid that is 
exposed when cels are primed for apoptosis (22). By expressing phosphatidylserine, 
Ebola tricks dendritic cels into thinking that the virus is in fact debris that needs to be 
engulfed and destroyed, thereby essentialy inviting itself into the dendritic cel 
endosome. Vaccinia virus also uses this mode of apoptotic mimicry; it is thought to be a 
survival mechanism for larger viruses, such as Ebola and Vaccina, because it would be 
dificult for them to enter cels via more traditional routes (106). 
Once a cel is targeted by Ebolavirus, the GP spikes bind to the surface of that cel 
and the virus gets taken up into the endosome by macropinocytosis (22). However, Ebola 
needs to gain access to the cytoplasm before it can replicate. In order for the virus to 
escape the endosomal compartment, two cysteine proteases: cathepsin B and cathepsin L 
cleave GP into two separate molecules: GP1, a receptor binding subunit and GP2, a 
membrane fusion subunit (21). Although viruses normaly avoid cysteine proteases 
because they are known to break down viral particles, Ebola needs these enzymes to 
jetison the heavily glycosylated caps that form the GP trimer (22; 27; 28). Once cleaved, 
the receptor-binding fragment (18kD N-Terminal Fragment) that resides on the underside 
of GP1 is exposed (27). This fragment binds to Niemann Pick C1 (NPC1), a protein that 
dwels in endosomal membranes (NPC1 normaly traffics intracelular cholesterol) (22). 
NPC1 acts as a receptor for Ebolavirus and expedites viral entry (28). In fact, without this 
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receptor, Ebola is stuck in the endosome and is rendered non-functional, and for this 
reason is curently being studied as a possible anti-viral drug target. 
NPC1-GP1 binding is imperative for viral escape from the endosome and entry 
into the cytoplasm of the cel. While GP1 binds to NPC1, GP2 is responsible for 
mediating the fusion of the virus to the endosomal membrane (23). The virus is then 
taken up into the cytoplasm of the cel where the genome is uncoated, transcribed into 
mRNA, replicated and assembled. New viruses are formed, released and available to 
target new cels. 
As mentioned above, Ebola’s early and prefered sites of viral replication are 
dendritic cels, the primary antigen presenting cels of the innate immune system (16). 
One of the main functions of any antigen presenting cel is to alert the adaptive immune 
system of viral invasion by capturing antigen and presenting it to naïve TCels (in the 
context of Class I MHC) that reside in the lymph nodes. Dendritic cels also are 
responsible for secreting prostimulatory cytokines that induce celular and humoral 
adaptive immune responses that can clear an infection. Ebola-infected dendritic cels 
never mature or secrete the cytokines necessary to upregulate MHC Class I to the cel 
surface and antigen can’t be presented to TCels in the lymph node (233). As a result, 
neither celular nor humoral responses wil be activated (233; 26). By infecting and 
disabling dendritic cels, Ebola eliminates the critical link between innate and adaptive 
immune systems. 
Infected dendritic cels are also tasked with releasing interferon, a type of 
cytokine that slows down viral replication, which gives the immune system time to mount 
an adaptive immune response (233). However, one of the halmarks of an Ebola infection 
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is its ability to prevent the activation of interferon. Specificaly, VP24 and VP35 serve as 
interferon antagonists that leave the immune system highly compromised and unable to 
control viral replication (16; 26; 29; 30). 
The second target cels of Ebola are monocytes and macrophages, also cels of the 
innate immune system (16; 26). Their main responsibilities are to phagocytize celular 
debris and present antigen to naïve TCels, much like dendritic cels. Under normal 
circumstances, infected macrophages and monocytes release inflammatory cytokines 
upon encountering an antigen, such as TNF, IL1, IL2, IL6, IL15, IL8, and MIP1 and 
nitric oxide (29). TNF, IL6, IL8 and IL12 are inflammatory cytokines that are responsible 
for many of the symptoms that are associated with an ilness, such as fever and lethargy. 
They are also responsible for vascular permeability, which alows lymphocytes access to 
the site of infection. MIP1 and MCP1 are tasked with recruiting more monocytes and 
macrophages to fight of pathogens (233).  
Towards the tail end of an infection a regulatory process is activated by IL10, an 
anti-inflammatory cytokine. IL10 suppresses the production of inflammatory cytokines 
and alows the body to return to its normal state (233). However, during an Ebola 
infection, the inflammatory process is never regulated and inflammation operates in a 
continuous loop. Infected macrophages travel to the lymph nodes; they express cytokines 
that increase inflammation and growth stimulation chemokines that atract more 
monocytes and macrophages to the site of infection; these new monocytes and 
macrophages become infected themselves; they in turn express more cytokines, which 
increases inflammation; and so on and so on (30). 
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While IL10 has been detected in patients who have fatal Ebola infections, it could 
be that not enough is produced to overcome cytokine storm that causes much of the 
pathogenesis associated with the disease. Unregulated inflammation and viral replication 
are responsible for coagulation abnormalities; hypotension (the result of hepatocelular 
damage and high nitric oxide levels); increased vascular permeability, including damage 
to endothelial cels (generaly late in an infection), vascular colapse, severe vomiting, 
diarhea, hypovolemic shock and organ failure. (16; 29; 31) Ebola patients also 
experience large loss of lymphocytes, known as bystander lymphocytes apoptosis. While 
lymphoid tissues are targets for viral invasion, the lymphocytes themselves are not. The 
apoptosis is corelated with an increase of Fas/FasL and TNF-induced TRAIL ligands, 
but the mechanisms underlying the cause of the apoptosis are not wel known. It is 
thought that dendritic cel dysfunction or an overproduction of nitric oxide from infected 
macrophages might play a role in stimulating the large die-of of lymphocytes (29; 31; 
16; 30; 38). 
Necrosis of the liver, while not fatal in and of itself, results in decreased synthesis 
of coagulation factors, which contribute to hemorhagic symptoms and are consistent 
with disseminated intravascular coagulation (31; 16). It also has been speculated that 
tissue factors released from infected macrophages and monocytes may be responsible for 
coagulation disorders (16). 
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Immune Response to Ebola Infections  
There is considerable debate in the scientific community regarding the adaptive immune 
response in Ebola patients. In particular, a consensus has not been reached about which 
arm of the adaptive system is more essential: TCel activation or antibody production. 
Part of the problem in coming to an agreement is the dearth of Ebola studies on human 
subjects. Ebola outbreaks occur unexpectedly and infrequently and when they do, 
patients oftentimes die too quickly to obtain measurable samples (42; 30). Furthermore, 
the lethality of the virus leaves very few options for celular experiments or autopsy 
because Ebola must be tested and examined in a BSL4 laboratory. There are fewer than 
50 of these labs in the world and none that exist in Ebola endemic regions (sources: 
htp:/fas.org/programs/bio/biosafetylevels.html and 
htps:/www.google.com/fusiontables/DataSource?snapid=S567513UnBn). As a result, 
most of the understanding with respect to how the adaptive immune system functions 
during an Ebola infection is extrapolated from mouse, guinea pig and non-human primate 
models. Most of these experiments are done in the context of measuring immune 
responses in a variety of vaccine platforms and the results are at times contradictory. For 
example, some mouse models were able to show that protection from lethal Ebola 
chalenge was defined by a robust CD8+ TCel response and that CD4+ TCels were not 
required for eVLP-mediated protection (32; 33; 34; 30) while other studies in non-human 
primates showed the opposite efect (35; 30). Likewise, the research on the necessity of a 
humoral response in mouse and non-human primate models is contradictory as wel (35; 
30; 36). 
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Despite the pathogenicity of the Ebola virus, there have been studies done on 
human blood samples that have elucidated the diferences in the immune responses 
between patients who die from an Ebola infection and those who live. One study was 
done on a subset of patients from the Mayibout and Booue outbreaks in the Gabon in 
1996 (37). A longitudinal analysis was performed on blood samples that were taken from 
a group of fatal cases and survivors over the course of their ilness and during the 
recovery period of survivors. A control group of healthy people who were not infected 
with the virus was also included in the analysis. The results indicated that fatal outcomes 
were associated with a suboptimal humoral response defined by indiscernible IgM and no 
detection of IgG production whatsoever. The release of Interferon-gamma in the early 
days of infection in fatal cases indicates that the immune system atempts to mount an 
TCel response but these early eforts are folowed by the complete disappearance of 
TCel activity (as measured by TCel related mRNA) and extensive lymphocyte apoptosis 
during the last five days infection. Although viral titers were relatively equal between 
fatal cases and survivors on Day 2 of the disease, by Day 4 fatal cases had viral titers that 
were up to 200% higher than survivors.  
Patients who survived an Ebola infection mounted early IgM antibodies and 
Ebola specific IgG directed at VP 25, VP40 and NP. While survivors did not mount a 
CD8+ response during the symptomatic phase of the disease, increasing levels of Fas Fas 
L and perforin during the recovery phase indicate that a cytotoxic TCel response 
coresponds with viral clearance from the blood. While both humoral and celular 
responses are important for clearing an infection, the severely impaired and non-
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functional antibody responses in fatal cases support the theory that the humoral activity is 
imperative to control virus replication. 
A cross sectional study was done using blood samples taken from 42 non-
survivors and 14 survivors of the Gabon and Democratic Republic of Congo outbreaks 
from 1996 and 2003(38). Those who cleared the infection were able to regulate the 
inflammatory cytokine storm brought on by infected macrophages and monocytes; did 
not experience bystander lymphocyte apoptosis; and mounted early humoral and celular 
responses, including tightly regulated activation of cytotoxic TCels. Fatal cases 
experienced cytokine levels that were five – 1000 times greater than those found in 
healthy people and peaked two days before death.  
Immune events that occur early in the infection can determine whether or not a 
person wil be able to control viral replication or if the infection wil result in death (29). 
A fatal case of Ebola wil successfuly suppress the innate and adaptive immune 
responses by infecting and disabling dendritic cels. Infected macrophages secret 
inflammatory cytokines that are never regulated and results in prolonged cytokine 
secretion (38). VP35 and VP24 suppress interferon activation, alowing the virus to 
proliferate and spread throughout the body via the circulatory system. Although TCel 
activation is atempted, it is quickly disabled by down-regulation of Type One interferon 
(38). Increased lymphocyte apoptosis results in increasing viral loads; patients who fail to 
recover also have virtualy no viral antigen specific antibodies (29). By the end of a fatal 
infection, patients sufer from chronic inflammation and high viral titers that manifest in 
systemic organ failure, impairment of the vascular system, hypovolemic shock and death 
(16; 29). 
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Although there are clear immune response disparities between survivors and 
fatalities, it has been dificult for scientists to understand why exactly some people can 
clear the infection and some cannot. It has been suggested that the Ebolavirus is not able 
to replicate in people who are deficient in the NPC1 gene that is imperative for viral entry 
into the cel cytoplasm (28) (NPC1 deficiency results in Niemann-Pick disease, a 
recessive disorder that causes accumulation of cholesterol in the endosome of cels). 
There may be confounding factors as wel such as underlying/pre-existing health 
conditions, co-infections and general overal health prior to exposure to Ebola (30). Also, 
individuals who seek and obtain proper care as soon as symptoms present themselves, 
and before viral load and inflammation become uncontroled, invariably have more 
positive outcomes. The mode of infection may be a factor. In the inaugural Zaire 
Ebolavirus outbreak, those who were infected through the use of contaminated needles 
had a 100% fatality rate, while the overal case fatality rate for the infections transmited 
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Ebola Virus Transmission, Clinical Presentation, and Asymptomatic Cases 
 
Transmission 
The Ebola virus can only be transmited when a susceptible individual comes into direct 
contact with the bodily fluids of an infected and symptomatic Ebola patient (39; 41). 
These bodily fluids include: vomitus, feces, blood, saliva, tears, breast milk, and semen. 
Breast milk and semen were found to be culture positive after Ebolavirus had already 
cleared from the blood and up to 40 days post disease onset (40). The virus contained in 
these fluids enters the uninfected host through breaks in mucosal surfaces or abrasions in 
the epidermis (5; 16). 
The route of transmission that caries the most risk is household transmission, 
which generaly occurs when a family member or friend cares for an Ebola patient and is 
exposed to the virus through close personal contact. Data from the first Sudan Ebolavirus 
outbreak in 1976 indicated that persons who provided nursing care to sick family 
members had a 5.1 fold increased risk of infection (95). A study of patients in the Kikwit 
outbreak in 1996 showed that direct physical contact with an infected person during the 
clinicaly apparent phase of ilness was the most important risk factor for household 
transmission (96). 
Nosocomial transmission can occur when health care workers are exposed to the 
bodily fluids of infected patients. Idealy, doctors and nurses should protect themselves 
by wearing personal protective equipment (PPE) with ful body coverage. However if the 
strict donning, dofing and decontamination protocols are not folowed, there is a risk of 
viral transmission and self-contamination. Of particular concern is the removal of PPE 
after caring for patients. Even if the protective gear is put on properly and no exposure to 
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viraly infected bodily fluids occurs during the course of care, a health care worker can 
stil become infected if there is a breach in dofing protocols (121). Ebola viruses can live 
on inanimate objects and fomites for up to a few hours (or longer in ideal conditions), 
(39; 40) therefore in order to prevent exposure to the virus it is imperative that the 
removal of PPE and proper decontamination procedures are folowed in a systematic way 
and under supervision. 
The lack of PPE and the unfamiliarity with its proper use is not a problem that is 
peculiar to West Africa. Hospitals in the developed world also ran into nosocomial 
chalenges while treating Ebola patients. A nurse in Spain also contracted the disease 
when she touched her face with the gloves she wore while treating a Spanish missionary 
priest (42) After Thomas Eric Duncan was admited into Dalas Presbyterian Hospital 
with Ebola in the September 2014, two nurses who cared for him were infected with the 
virus. It is thought the lack of appropriate protective gear; improper training; and lax 
disinfecting procedures were the reasons behind the transmision of the virus (43). 
In past outbreaks, nosocomial transmission has accounted for a significant 
proportion of cases. In the first outbreak in Zaire, the single greatest risk factor for 
contracting Ebola, especialy during the early part of the epidemic, was receiving an 
injection at the Yambuku Mission Hospital (which was the focal point of the outbreak). 
Furthermore, 11 out of 17 of the Mission Hospital staf died and the hospital had to close 
(52). During the 1976 Sudanese outbreak, Maridi Hospital was the amplifying source of 
the epidemic where 46% of the cases hospitalized (93). A quarter of the 315 cases in the 
1995 Ebola outbreak in Kikwit were among doctors and nurses, al of whom cared for 
Ebola patients without protective gear (45). During the 2007 Ebola outbreak in 
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Bundibugyo, Uganda, 14 healthcare workers were infected before implementation of 
standard barier practices. After implementation of the precautions there were not any 
nosocomial cases reported (45). 
People in Africa are also at risk of exposure to the virus when they participate in 
traditional funeral practices where is it common for mourners to wash, kiss and touch 
corpses. Unlike other viruses, Ebola remains pathogenic in the blood and bodily fluids of 
a deceased patient and those who handle or touch the bodies are at risk of being exposed 
to the virus (2; 16; 5; 39). The funeral rite can last for weeks as the deceased are often 
transported back to their home communities for the burial. In addition, family members 
and friends travel significant distances to atend funerals and then return home, enabling 
the virus to spread across borders (97). 
 While it has been suggested that Ebola may be transmited via an airborne route 
through the inhalation of aerosols, there isn’t much evidence to support this. Airborne 
transmission of a virus requires inhalation of an infectious dose of that virus in droplet 
nuclei form. These smal infectious particles are able to penetrate the deepest tissues of 
the lung, where the virus wil atach to the endothelial cels of the respiratory tract and 
become pathogenic.  
 In the case of Ebola, the target cels of the Ebolavirus do not reside in the 
epithelial cels of the bronchial tubes, respiratory tract or lung, but rather in the cels of 
the innate immune system, such as dendritic cels, macrophages, monocytes, and 
eventualy the vascular system. Research that has been conducted thus far on the 
pathogenesis of Ebola has not shown that the cels of the respiratory tract become 
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infected and very few patients show respiratory symptoms such as coughing and 
wheezing (120). 
 
Clinical Presentation of Disease (46) 
 
The clinical symptoms of an Ebola infection folow a common patern. After initial virus 
exposure, there is a two-21 day incubation period (mean of five-seven days) during which 
a patient has a pre-clinical infection and is not considered contagious and cannot transmit 
the virus to a non-infected person (16; 39). After the incubation period is over and Ebola 
viral load reaches a certain threshold, there is abrupt onset of symptoms after which point 
a person is contagious and able to transmit the virus.  
Symptom manifestation can be divided into three distinct groups. In the early 
febrile phase, zero-three days post symptom onset, patients experience fever, malaise, 
fatigue, body aches and anorexia; al non-specific symptoms that can be misdiagnosed or 
confused with malaria, typhoid, cholera or influenza.  
In the second gastrointenstinal phase, generaly three to 10 days post symptom 
onset, fever persists as gastrointestinal symptoms begin to manifest with patients 
experiencing nausea, vomiting and diarhea. In some patients, the fluid loss is of the 
magnitude of cholera patients: up to five (possibly 10) liters a day. It is during this phase 
that hemorhagic symptoms wil appear which includes petechiae, ecchymoses, oozing 
and bleeding from venipuncture sites, mucosal hemorrhages and macropapular rashes 
(16). 
In the third phase, seven to 16 days after symptom onset, patients diverge into one 
of two categories: those who succumb to the infection and those who wil survive. In 
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those cases that wil be fatal, there is profound fluid loss due to chronic diarhea and 
vomiting that results in electrolyte depletion. The body goes into circulatory colapse, 
hypovolemic shock, and systematic organ failure, most notably metabolic acidosis and a 
failure to produce urine (16). During this phase patients can also sufer from 
hyponatraemia, which can cause brain sweling with raised intracranial pressure (107). 
Patients also tend to lose consciousness or fal into a coma and experience rapid breathing 
before death. In patients who wil survive, symptoms begin to improve during this phase, 
and most patients who survive to day 13 ultimately live (16; 46). 
 
Asymptomatic Cases of Ebola  
While most patients infected with Ebolavirus exhibit severe symptoms, there have been 
documented cases of patients who are clearly infected with the virus (as measured by 
circulating anti-Ebola antibodies and a positive RT-PCR for Ebola RNA fragments), yet 
remain asymptomatic throughout the course of the disease (47; 48; 49; 50). It is assumed 
that these individuals are most likely not infectious, and it is likewise assumed that their 
exposure confers protective immunity, despite the fact that they did not present 
symptoms (50; 46). 
Retrospective serological surveys done after the inaugural Ebola outbreak in 
Sudan in 1976 showed that 19% of contacts of persons with the disease had anti-Ebola 
antibodies even though they never became il themselves (51). During the 1976 Zaire 
Ebolavirus outbreak, less than 2.5% of people who had contact with fatal cases 
experienced subclinical infections (52). Furthermore, serological surveys conducted in 
1977 in the Tandala region of Zaire showed that 79 out of 1096 people (7%) tested were 
found to have antibodies to Ebola although they gave no history of severe disease (51). 
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More recently, after the Kikwit outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1996, 
samples taken from 152 contacts of confirmed Ebola patients showed that five of them 
(3.2%) were IgM and IgG positive even though there was not morbidity associated with 
their infection (53). 
In Northeastern Gabon there were three Zaire Ebola outbreaks between 1994 and 
1996 (47). Nine hundred and seventy nine (979) people from the region were 
serologicaly tested (taken from a study population of 2533) in an atempt to ascertain the 
level asymptomatic cases from those outbreaks. The results showed that 14 of the 979 
were seropositive for IgM and IgG anti-Ebola antibodies. Of these 14, four were listed as 
previous cases in oficial documents from the February 1996 outbreak and each one of 
them had clinical disease and typical Ebola-like symptoms. The remaining ten 
seropositive people were not listed as patients in any outbreak and did not report having 
had Ebola-like symptoms (51). 
In another study of asymptomatic patients from the Gabon in 1996, investigators 
sampled 24 contacts of diagnosed Ebola patients (48; 49) (it is unclear how investigators 
came to study these particular 24 people or why they were chosen in the first place. It is 
likewise unknown what the underlying health conditions were of the 24 people). Each 
contact was prospectively studied to measure immune responses and disease progression. 
They al shared a household with laboratory confirmed Ebola patients and administered 
care to them without any protective equipment, even rudimentary prophylaxis such as 
gloves. Although they were directly exposed to the feces, vomit, sweat and blood of non-
fatal and fatal Ebola patients, they did not develop symptoms (49). 
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Samples from the 24 individuals were taken on four occasions over a one-month 
period, starting with one week after initial exposure to the virus. The first samples that 
were taken did not detect antibody, indicating that they were Ebola naïve and had not 
previously mounted an immune response. Two to three weeks after exposure, 11 of the 
24 patients produced measureable Ebola specific IgM and IgG response to Ebola 
antigens. IgM antibody was detected 15 – 18 days post viral exposure, folowed by 
Ebolavirus specific IgG2 and IgG3 antibody reactive to NP and VP40 approximately one 
week after that (48). Antibody production in asymptomatic patients was delayed in 
comparison to antibody production in symptomatic patients (53). 
Although circulating Ebola antigen was never detected, at day seven to day 21 
post exposure, Ebola RNA was detected in seven out of the 11 antibody positive 
asymptomatic individuals via nested RT-PCR. Furthermore, the RNA fragments were 
only found in the peripheral blood mononuclear cels, indicating a low viral load, which 
is consistent with the lack of circulating antigen (48). 
Al told, 46% of close contacts of Ebola patients in this study had replicative 
Ebola infection and did not present any symptoms of the disease (49). While the number 
of asymptomatic patients uncovered in the studies reviewed here are very low, they 
nonetheless establish that it is possible for people to have exposure to the Ebolavirus, 
develop an infection that provokes an immune response, yet never present symptoms. 
The authors do not hypothesize that this percentage could be applied to any or al Ebola 
outbreaks, rather they only reported on what was found in this individual investigation. In 
absence of further studies, it is dificult, if not impossible, to assume that the same 
percentage of asymptomatic individuals can be found in any given Ebola outbreak. 
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There have also been known cases of Ebola infected patients who do have 
symptoms, but they are very mild. In the 1976 outbreaks, WHO teams noted that there 
was a continuum of symptoms that ranged from mild to rapidly fatal (52). In the 2007 
outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo, it is thought that the index patient, a 42-
year-old man, contracted the virus after handling bats he purchased in a market. His only 
symptoms were a low-grade fever and headache, and never transmited the virus to his 
wife, with whom he is assumed to have had close contact. However, his daughter became 
il and died during a time frame that was consistent with the Ebola incubation period, 
leading investigators to conclude that her father infected her. An investigation into the 
lifestyle paterns of that family suggested that while the father walked from town to his 
home vilage, a trip of three to four hours, he caried his daughter on his back. It was 
speculated that the daughter could have become infected through exposure to her father’s 
sweat (39; 54). 
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Treatment of Ebola  
As was discussed above, Ebola survivors have a very diferent immune response to the 
virus than those who die from the disease. Survivors mount an early innate response that 
is marked by cytokine regulation as wel as an adaptive response that is defined by anti-
Ebola antibody production and cytotoxic TCel activity. Although the scientific 
community has been able to establish that there are indeed diferences in immune 
responses, the reasons why there are diferences have remained elusive. Potential 
confounders and genetic diferences have been discussed above. Disparities in the 
qualitative and quantitative measures of care also have been considered a defining factor 
in determining patient outcomes (55; 107) Several reports from the field of the West 
African outbreak have provided more details as to what kind of treatment in particular is 
thought to contribute to patient survival. Specificaly, patients who are treated with 
aggressive rehydration therapies under adequate medical supervision have a greater 
chance of survival (56; 57; 58). Although oral and intravenous rehydration therapies have 
been used in past outbreaks: intravenous fluids were first used in the 1976 outbreak in 
Zaire to treat three nuns. In Kikwit in 1995, rehydration therapies were used in the last 
few weeks of the outbreak in approximately 25 patients (60). However, their 
efectiveness has not been rigorously evaluated (55). 
 Aggressive rehydration therapy was thought to have been a factor in the treatment 
of two Ebola patients who were treated at Emory University Hospital in July – August 
2014 (59). Patient One began treatment in Atlanta on Day 10 of his ilness; Patient Two 
began her treatment on Day 15. Both patients were hypovolemic upon presentation; had 
low potassium, calcium and sodium measurements; and both showed signs of liver 
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dysfunction, manifestations that are al known significant risk factors for death. Patient 
One had more severe symptoms: persistent rash, vomiting of blood and diarheal output 
of 2-4 liters a day, while Patient Two didn’t experience nausea or vomiting and remained 
afebrile throughout the course of her ilness.  
Upon admission to Emory, both patients received aggressive fluid and electrolyte 
replacement with an emphasis on potassium and calcium replacement. At the beginning 
of his ilness in Africa, Patient One received intravenous Ringers Solution and was able 
to drink Tang and Gatorade, despite anorexia. Patient Two was wel enough in Africa to 
drink oral rehydration fluids from the onset of her symptoms.  
Both patients received three doses of ZMAPP in the context of their treatment and 
Patient One also received one unit of convalescent whole blood from a patient who 
recovered from Ebola. Because both patients received diferent layers of treatment 
throughout their ilness, it is dificult to isolate which treatment in particular may have 
had the largest impact on recovery. However, doctors who treated both patients, and 
investigators who reported on the protocols used at Emory, believe that rehydration 
therapies, with an emphasis on calcium and potassium replacement, had significant value 
in the recovery of these two patients. 
Under normal circumstances, intravenous fluid therapy and electrolyte 
replacement could assuage dehydration, but it is dificult, if not impossible, to extend this 
type of care in an Ebola hot zone considering the number of patients, the dearth of health 
care workers and the limited time in, and the cumbersome nature of, personal protective 
equipment (55; 56; 61; 107). 
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It is important to consider that the Emory patients were treated under ideal 
conditions: they were in an internationaly known hospital with a 24 hour staf dedicated 
exclusively to monitoring their progress and maintaining fluid and electrolyte levels. 
While this type of intense care does not exist in West Africa, rehydration therapies have 
nonetheless improved outcomes in Ebola patients there. In Nigeria, only 40% of patients 
in the recent outbreak died, and intense rehydration therapy was credited with the high 
survival rates. Some patients in Nigeria were drinking up to five or six liters of Oral 
Rehydration Solution a day, at times forcing themselves to do so despite overwhelming 
nausea, weakness and lethargy (56; 57). One patient reported that it was dificult for her 
to even wrap her fingers around her cup, let alone lift it to her mouth to drink. Although 
this data is anecdotal in nature, and cannot be proven scientificaly, Nigerian doctors 
believe that focusing on rehydration as the main component of patient management made 
a diference in patient outcomes.  
A more systematic study was conducted on 37 laboratory confirmed Ebola cases 
in Conakry, Guinea from March 25 – April 26 (58). Al 37 patients were treated in an 
MSF-run Ebola Treatment Center and were admited, on average, five days after 
symptom onset. Most presented with symptoms typical of an Ebola infection: fever, 
vomiting, diarhea, lack of appetite and lethargy. Very few of the patients had known co-
infections or conditions, and a regression analysis revealed that age was the only 
statisticaly significant predictor of death (Relative Risk of death for those over 40 
compared to those under 40 == 3.49; pvalue = .0007). Investigators did not include the 
type of treatment received into the model, so it is impossible to know how significant the 
diferent regimes were in preventing death. However, 99% of patients (N=36) received 
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Oral Rehydration Therapy and 77% of those (N=28) were also given intravenous fluids. 
The Case Fatality Rate for this group of patients was 40%. The authors of the study 
concluded that the use of oral and intravenous fluids and electrolyte replacement did 
improve survival rates in this Ebola Treatment Center above al other kinds of treatments 
that were given. 
By way of comparison, the Case Fatality Rate at the very beginning of the 
outbreak in Guinea was 86% among confirmed cases and 71% among clinicaly 
suspected cases. It is suspected that most of those early cases were misdiagnosed and/or 
did not receive medical care specific for Ebola, if they received care at al (1). Therefore 
comparing Case Fatality Rates from the beginning of the outbreak to the Case Fatality 
Rates reported in this study of 37 patients at an MSF-run Ebola Treatment Center might 
not be a fair comparison. At best, it might be a comparison between Case Fatality Rates 
of those who received no medical treatment at al to those who received any kind of 
medical treatment. 
Another Ebola Treatment Center in West Africa likewise concluded that 
rehydration therapy ameliorated the consequences of hypovolemic shock and contributed 
to the survival of Ebola patients (46). Doctors from the ELWA-3 Ebola treatment center 
in Monrovia, Liberia put a priority on rehydration therapies and implemented a 
systematic way of categorizing patients according to their rehydration needs upon 
presentation: 1. Hypovolemic, not in shock, and able to provide self-care; 2. 
Hypovolemic, not in shock, but unable to provide self-care; and 3. in shock with 
evidence of organ failure whose outcome would not be altered by any available medical 
intervention. It was observed that early rehydration interventions, whether administered 
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oraly or intravenously, controled symptoms, mitigated massive gastrointestinal losses 
(up to five – ten liters a day), limited the life-threatening consequences of hypovolemic 
shock and increased the chance of recovery (107). 
However, the success of these treatments is only as good as a doctor’s ability to 
implement them. Routine use of intravenous therapy in ELWA-3 was hindered by the 
number of doctors and nurses available to care for patients (this study cited a ratio of 1 
doctor for 30-50 patients) and the limited time that health care staf was able to be in 
personal protective equipment (each doctor was limited to 60 minutes three times a day in 
protective gear, which equaled one – two minutes per patient per day). Indeed, this gap in 
quantitative measures of care seems to be the primary deterent to including aggressive 
hydration therapies in the treatment of patients. 
It has not been proven statisticaly that the use of rehydration therapies, oral or 
intravenously, have an impact on reducing case fatality rates and improving patient 
outcomes. Al that we have are naratives from previous outbreaks and from the field in 
West Africa. Nonetheless, it is believed that many Ebola patients are dying without 
adequate fluid resuscitation and that this ‘unmet standard of care’ (61) is being wholy 
underused (56; 107). Doctors in the field in West Africa and those who have been 
studying this outbreak endorse a focus on immediate and consistent rehydration as a 
significant way to save the lives of Ebola patients (107). 
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Experimental Treatments for Ebola: Vaccines and Anti-Viral Therapies 
Although there are no vaccines and anti-viral medications approved to treat Ebola 
patients, there are several new drugs under development, some of which are curently in 
clinical trials.  
 
Blood Product from Convalescent Patients – This type of therapy involves transfusing 
blood products from Ebola survivors into curently infected Ebola patients (62; 63; 64). 
The hope is that neutralizing antibodies contained in survivor blood wil prime the 
immune system of the infected patient and enhance the ability of the recipient to clear the 
virus (64; 66). This treatment has had mixed results in non-human primate experiments. 
A 2007 study showed that neutralizing human monoclonal antibody, KZ52, an antibody 
that was derived from a survivor of the Kikwit outbreak, not only failed to protect 
macaques against chalenge with Ebola virus but also had a minimal efect on the 
explosive viral replication folowing infection (64). However, it did show potential 
neutralizing activity in cel culture and smal animal models. 
On the other hand, during the 1995 outbreak in Kikwit, eight patients were given 
whole blood transfusions from Ebola survivors of that same outbreak. Seven of the 
patients survived, however they were given the treatment late in the progression of their 
disease and it is thought that they most likely would have survived anyway (65; 66). In 
the Yambuku outbreak in 1976, 13 Ebola survivors donated plasma, and a laboratory 
technician received one of the units and survived (108). Likewise, in the 2014 outbreak, 
Dr. Ken Brantley was given a transfusion from an Ebola survivor in Africa and he in turn 
donated his own blood to three patients in the United States (66). Al four of these 
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patients (Dr. Brantley and the three patients who received his blood) were also receiving 
concurent aggressive therapies, which makes it dificult to ascertain how efective the 
transfusions were. 
There are at least three clinical trials in the ofing that wil atempt to evaluate the 
efectiveness of blood therapies. In October 2014 it was announced that the European 
Commission was giving $3.7 milion to fund a clinical coordinated by the Institute of 
Tropical Medicine in Antwerp, Belgium and run by MSF (109; 110; 66). The randomized 
trials are curently being held in Guinea (as of April 2005) where 200-300 patients wil 
be given blood plasma from recovered patients (119). While there is not a control group 
per se, patient outcomes wil be compared against outcomes of patients who did not 
receive transfers because a donor could not be matched. 
The Bil and Melinda Gates Foundation also earmarked $5.7 milion to fund 
another clinical trial in Liberia (63; 109) that is being run by Clinical RM, a US medical 
research organization (110). The trial protocol delineates that 70 participants wil receive 
plasma (119) from survivors at the ELWA2 hospital in Monrovia (109) in three 200ml 
doses over the course of four days. The control group, comprised of patients who are not 
eligible to receive the plasma due to incompatibilities with the donor pool, (109) wil 
receive the same standard of care regime as the treatment group, which is defined as 
intravenous fluid treatment and the consistent monitoring of vital signs, electrolyte levels 
and blood pressure (63). Post treatment measurements of viral load wil be tracked pre 
and post transfer and both groups wil be folowed until either recovery or death. A 
concern in this trial in February 2015 was the dearth of patients (less than five cases a 
week); the fact that some patients are ineligible; and the refusal of some to receive a 
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donation (110). As a result, a third trial has begin in Siera Leone, where as of February 
2015, up to 60-80 people were being infected, using the plasma donated for the Liberia 
trial (110). 
 
ZMapp – ZMapp is antiviral monoclonal antibody cocktail that binds to GP and 
neutralizes the virus and prevents it from entering cels (69). There are three diferent 
epitopes on GP1 that the drug targets: one on the glycan cap and two at the base of GP1 
(see Figure Seven) (67). Mouse models and studies using non-human primates that were 
given ZMapp showed a decreased death rate in the treated animals (71; 75; 78). ZMapp 
was administered to seven patients in the curent Ebola outbreak as part of their treatment 
protocol (75). Five survived and two died, but the drug was given in the context of a 






Figure Seven: an image of the 
epitopes on GP that ZMapp targets. 
The red and blue antibodies bind 
near the base of virus, preventing 
the virus from entering cels. A blue 
antibody binds to the glycan cap, 
signaling the immune system to the 
site of infection. 
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One of the major drawbacks with ZMapp is that the drug is manufactured using tobacco 
plants and the process is laborious and time-consuming (62). ZMapp Biopharmaceuticals, 
the developer of the drug, is working with the US Biomedical Advanced Research and 
Development Authority (BARDA) as wel as Genetech and Regeneron, two biotech 
companies, to develop ideas that wil increase production. One potential idea is to switch 
from the curent model that uses tobacco plants in Kentucky to manufacturing the drug in 
China using hamster ovaries. Mapp Biopharmaceuticals also recently signed a $24.9 
milion contract with BARDA to acquire US Food and Drug Administration approval for 
the drug and the drug went to clinical trial in February 2015. It is being run by the NIAID 
at the ELWA2 Ebola Treatment Center in Monrovia, and at the NIH Clinical Research 
Center in Bethesda. Eligible participants are adults and children who have been 
diagnosed with Ebola. Al patients wil be randomized to the treatment group, al of 
whom wil receive three infusions of ZMAPP on sequential days as wel as optimized 
care for an Ebola infection, which includes intravenous fluids, balancing electrolytes, and 
maintaining blood oxygen and pressure. The control group wil receive optimized care 
only (111). Starting the trial been hampered by the lack of product; al available doses of 
ZMAPP were exhausted in 2014 (70; 71). 
 
Brincidofovir – produced by Chimerix in Durham, North Carolina, Brincidofovir was 
originaly manufactured to treat DNA viruses such as adenoviruses, poxviruses, and 
herpesviruses (72; 62; 75). In the process of testing the drug for its initial purpose, 
Brincidofovir was discovered to limit Ebolavirus replication in cel culture (73). The 
oraly administered drug was being used in a clinical trial in the MSF-run ELWA-3 
Treatment Center in Monrovia, Liberia. The trial was being run by scientists from the 
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University of Oxford and uses the folowing metric to determine success: if under 50% of 
the patients treated survive the infection, then the drug wil be deemed no beter than 
curent supportive care. If more than 80% of patients survive, the drug wil be considered 
efective. Fifty percent – 80% survival wil warant further testing. Due to ethical 
concerns, there is no control group in this study (66; 72). However, as February 2015, the 
study was halted because there were not enough patients to conduct a statisticaly 
significant trial. Furthermore, Chimerix declared that the drug has been deprioritized and 
they would not be participating in any development of the drug in the future (112; 119). 
 
Faviporavir – A product of Fujifilm in Japan, Favriporavir is an RNA polymerase 
inhibitor, meaning that the drug thwarts the virus’s ability to assemble. The drug was 
initialy developed to treat novel or drug resistant influenza strains in Japan (62; 78). 
With respect to treating Ebola patients, Favriporavir has shown eficacy in mouse models 
if it is administered up to six days post exposure, but wasn’t as efective in non-human 
primate models (62; 78; 114). Mouse models for Ebola are not ideal because rodents 
only develop a mild form of the disease. To overcome this, scientists used geneticaly 
engineered mice that were more susceptible to lethal doses of the virus, which muddied 
the ability to apply the results to the human target population (62). At the time of this 
writing, the French biomedical company INSERM finished running human clinical trials 
at the MSF Ebola Treatment Center in Gueckedou, Guinea in which 69 adults and 
adolescents took the drug for up to 10 days and their outcomes were compared to patients 
who were treated at the same Center three months prior to the trial start (72; 113). Forty-
eight percent of the patients died, but it was unclear if the outcome was related to the 
amount of viral load measured when they presented or if it was due to the drug. The 
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results of the trial were inconclusive with INSERM citing that patient viral load may have 
been more of a determining factor than the drug eficacy. Patients who had lower viral 
load had beter outcomes than those with a higher viral load at the start of treatment, 
leaving investigators to speculate that the drug could improve outcomes if administered 
early in infection (113; 115; 119). More data is required to make any definitive 
conclusions. 
  
AVI-6002 – AVI-6002 is an antiviral therapeutic manufactured by Sarpeta Therapeutics 
in Cambridge, Massachusets (74). It works by targeting VP35 and VP24 viral proteins 
and showed partial protection and prevention of disease in studies using non-human 
primates. Two Phase I Clinical Trials were just completed and the published results 
indicate that the drug was safe and wel tolerated in 30 healthy male and female Ebola 
naïve subjects (77). 
 
TKM- Ebola – TKM-Ebola is a cocktail of three smal interfering RNA molecules that 
block the expression of L-protein, VP 35 and VP24 of the Ebola genome (114). The drug 
is delivered into cel cytoplasm via a lipid-based capsule and prevents the virus from 
replicating. Tekmira Pharmaceuticals in British Columba developed the drug after they 
received a $140 milion Department of Defense grant in 2010 (75). Studies in lab animals 
showed that the drug protected against Ebola infection. In January 2014, TKM-Ebola 
entered into a Phase I clinical trial, but it was put on hold in July, which was lifted in 
August, after there were signs that some patients showed developed elevated cytokine 
levels that mimicked those found in Ebola infections (76; 78; 62). A second single arm 
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trial began in March 2015 led by the University of Oxford in partnership with Siera 
Leone Ministry of Health to evaluate its eficacy (116). 
 
rVSV-ZEBOV Vaccine – This vaccine uses a vesicular stomatitis virus (VSV) that has 
been engineered to expresses Ebola GP instead of its natural surface protein. VSV is a 
member of the Rhabdoviridae family, which is a distant relative of filoviruses (see Figure 
Three). It causes disease in catle, horses, deer and pigs, but is generaly thought to be 
non-pathogenic in humans; at the very least, it causes asymptomatic disease or mild flu-
like symptoms. This, along with the fact that there is a low percentage of VSV 
seropositivity in the general population, makes VSV an atractive viral vector (79). 
rVSV-ZEBOV was developed in partnership with the Public Health Agency of 
Canada and New Link Genetics of Ames, Iowa. New Link went into partnership with 
Merck in November 2014, with the later paying $30 milion up front for exclusive rights 
for the vaccine and any of its ofshoots. New Link wil get $20 milion more when the 
vaccine enters the testing phase (80). 
Although rVSV-ZEBOV uses a live virus vector, it isn’t a pre-emptive vaccine. In 
monkey models, the drug was administered 30 minutes after viral exposure; half of 
animals died. In October 2014, the vaccine went into Phase I Clinical Trials at the Walter 
Reed Army Institute of Research (82; 83). In November 2014, additional Phase I trials 
began in Germany, Switzerland, Gabon, Kenya, and Canada (119). The Swiss arm of the 
trial was put on hold after some subjects complained of joint pain (84). It was expected 
that trials would resume in January 2015 (81). A Phase II trial was launched in March 
2015 that is being run by the WHO, the Guinean Ministry of Health and MSF in which 
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investigators wil utilize a ring vaccination strategy whereby an ‘index case’ wil be 
identified and al of that persons contacts wil be vaccinated. The vaccine wil be 
evaluated by how wel it protects the contacts and protects those who they come into 
contact with (118; 119). 
 
chAd30-EPOV – chAd30-EPOV is a vaccine candidate that was developed by the 
Vaccine Center for Research at the National Institute of Alergy and Infectious Disease  
(USNIAID) in Bethesda, Maryland and manufactured by Glaxo-Smith-Kline (86). The 
original technology for the vaccine was actualy developed in part by Okaidos, an Italian 
company that has been working on Ebola vaccines with the National Institutes of Health 
since 2011. Glaxo-Smith-Kline bought Okaidos in 2013 for $235 milion (85; 81). 
The cdAd30-EBOV vaccine uses a modified chimp adenovirus (that is not 
pathogenic in humans and has been modified not to replicate) as a viral vector that has a 
single atachment of GP from two Ebola strains on the surface (86). Animal model 
studies showed that the vaccine was protective. Phase I Trials took place in Maryland and 
the United Kingdom in September (119). Results from the Maryland trials indicated that 
there were no safety concerns and the vaccine-induced immune response was in keeping 
with what was reported from preclinical trials involving non-human primates (86; 87). 
Participants in this Phase I trial dose escalation received a single intramuscular 
shot in one of two diferent doses. Those who received the higher dose of the vaccine 
showed higher anti-GP antibody titers to both the Zaire and the Sudan Ebolavirus strains. 
They also mounted CD4+ and CD8+ TCel responses, which were measured by the 
expression of cytokines, specificaly INF gamma, IL2 and Tumor Necrosis Factor. 
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Furthermore, those in the higher dose group had a higher proportion of CD8+ TCels, 
which have been known to confer protection in non-human primates (87). 
 Phase I Trials chAd30-EPOV also started in October in Mali and Switzerland; 
with the Mail branch of the trial being run by the Center for Vaccine Development at the 
University of Maryland Medical School. Phase I trials are set to begin in regions of 
Africa that are outside the curent outbreak zone. Proposed sites include Cameroon, 
Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal (119; 86; 87). 
There are also plans to fast track Phase II trials that wil test the New Link/Merck 
vaccine concurently with the Glaxo Smith Kline product. The trials began in March 
2015 in Siera Leone, where 8000 health care workers are to be given both vaccine 
candidates in a step-wise fashion (88; 119). Another trial in Liberia run by the NIH and 
the Ministry of Health in Liberia is intended to be a comparative analysis study that was 
slated to start in March 2015 (119). There wil be three groups of patients, each of whom 
wil receive the VSV vaccine, the adenovirus vaccine, or a placebo. No information is 
available at the time of this writing as to what kind of enhanced treatment the control 
group wil receive (88). 
 
Ad26-EBOV/ MVA-EBOV - Johnson and Johnson entered into partnership with 
USNIAID and Bavarian Nordic, a Danish pharmaceutical company, to develop this 
prime-boost vaccine protocol. Johnson & Johnson developed the prime (ad26-EBOV) 
and Bavarian Nordic developed the booster shot (MVA-EBOV). The vaccine is curently 
in a randomized controled Phase I Clinical Trials at the University of Oxford. Johnson & 
Johnson spent $200 milion to fast track production of one milion doses that are expected 
to be available in May 2015. It was recently announced that a second Phase I Trial of the 
   50 
prime/boost vaccine wil be run by Optimal Research in Maryland and they were 
curently recruiting volunteers as of February 2015 (89; 90). 
 
Other Vaccines – Two other vaccine candidates are in production. Profectus Biosciences 
in Baltimore Maryland recently completed an Investigational New Drug application for 
VesiculoVax, their rVSV vaccine. Animal studies showed that their vaccine was 100% 
protective in non-human primates. The company has been working with the BARDA and 
the United States Health and Human Services (HHS) since 2007 on Ebola vaccines. 
Profectus recently received $5.8 milion from BARDA and HHS to take their vaccine 
candidate to Phase I Trials in mid-2015. Including this most recent funding, Profectus has 
secured a total of $27.9 milion to develop their Ebola vaccine. They also received an 
additional $9.5 milion contract from the Department of Defense to develop a trivalent 
Ebola vaccine (91). 
 Geovax, an Atlanta company, has also been working on a modified vaccinia virus 
vector vaccine that is based on the atenuated smal pox vaccine that was given to 
100,000 people in the 1970’s. They curently have grant proposals in to the National 
Institutes of Health and the Department of Defense (85). 
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History of Ebola Virus Outbreaks (see Figure Eight) 
 
Two Inaugural Outbreaks 
Ebola Hemorhagic Fever, now known as Ebola Virus Disease, was first discovered 
during two simultaneous epidemics of the then-unknown causative agent in Central 
Africa in 1976 (16). 
 
Sudan, 1976(16; 93) The first outbreak was in Nzara and Maridi, Sudan from June– 
November 1976. The outbreak began when three men who worked in a coton factory in 
Nzara became il and died. Although al three men worked together, they did not live 
close to one another and had no known contact outside of the factory. Two of the three 
original cases, known as YB and BZ, are believed to only have transmited the virus to 
members of their family who cared for them while they were sick. YG developed 
symptoms on June 27, 1976 was admited into the Nzara Hospital on June 30 and died on 
July 6. BZ was admited into the hospital on July 12 and died on July 14. 
The third case, known as PG developed symptoms on July 18, 1976, was admited 
into the hospital on July 24 and died on July 27. PG was active and sociable in his 
community and is thought to have been the original source of 48 cases and 27 deaths. 
PG’s contacts spread the disease throughout the community of Nzara as wel as into the 
city of Maridi in late July (128 km away) where at least three people were admited to 
Maridi Hospital with the Ebola-like symptoms. The virus then spread throughout the 
hospital to staf who worked there, to other patients and into the community at large. In 
the beginning of September, there was an additional cluster of six cases and 25 contacts 
in Nzara. Although these six new cases worked at the coton factory, they were unrelated 
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to the three original cases (or any of their contacts) and they reported having no previous 
contact with anyone who had symptoms consistent with Ebola. Patients in both cities 
presented with symptoms typical of Ebola: they initialy had fever and headache that 
quickly progressed to diarhea, vomiting, chest pain and rash (in about half of the cases).  
While the cases in Nzara and Maridi had similar clinical manifestations, the 
transmission paterns in the two cities were very diferent. In Nzara, Ebola was spread 
mainly through the contacts of the original three factory workers, while nosocomial 
transmission was the driver behind the spread of the disease in Maridi. Of the 213 cases 
in Maridi, 93 of them acquired the disease in the hospital and of those, 72 were staf 
members who contracted the disease while they were working. By the time outbreak in 
Sudan was over, there were 67 cases and 31 deaths in Nzara; and 213 cases and 116 
deaths in Maridi for an overal Case Fatality Rate of 51%. The spilover event or zoonotic 
reservoir was never definitively identified for this outbreak, however the coton factory 
was implicated as the possible source of the infection. 
 
Zaire, 1976 (52) The second outbreak occured at almost the exact same time (September 
to November 1976) in neighboring Yambuku, Zaire (now known as the Democratic 
Republic of Congo). This outbreak began when the index case, a 44-year-old male 
schoolteacher, presented at the Yambuku Mission Hospital on August 26 with symptoms 
that were thought to be malaria. He was given a shot of anti-malarial medication after 
which his fever abated. On September 1, he developed fever again along with symptoms 
that were consistent with Ebola. He was admited to the hospital on September 5 and died 
on September 8. There were nine additional cases in early September, al of which 
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appeared to be unrelated with the exception that al had received treatment at the 
Hospital. It was later determined that 85 cases (out of 288 cases where transmission could 
be identified) could trace back acquisition of the disease to receiving injections at 
Yambuku Mission Hosptial; 149 of the 288 contracted the disease through close contact 
with an infected person; 43 of 288 had both contact with an il person and a history of 
receiving injections at the hospital. The disease hit hospital staf particularly hard: 11 out 
of 17 staf members died and the hospital closed after the medical director and three 
Belgian missionaries also died.  
By the end of the outbreak there were a total of 318 documented cases and 280 
deaths with a Case Fatality Rate of 88%. However, the Case Fatality Rate among those 
cases who became exposed to Ebola via injection was 100%: no one who had exclusive 
contact with the disease from a contaminated needle survived. 
The primary zoonotic event was never identified, and it is unclear if the index 
case was infected prior to seeking care and brought Ebola into the hospital or if the virus 
was already in the hospital and he himself was infected there. Be that as it may, the 
means by which the virus appeared in Zaire has not been identified. It was speculated at 
the time of the outbreak that the virus was brought directly from Sudan. It is also worth 
mentioning that the index case had been on a tour in rural areas surounding Yambuku 
with mission workers prior to becoming sick. It was reported that he purchased and 
handled monkey and antelope meat on August 22, and that his family later ate the 
antelope, but not the monkey. The timing of this bushmeat contact with respect to the 
onset of his symptoms may fit with the now-known pathogenesis and incubation period 
of Ebola, however no animal has been implicated as the source of the zoonotic event. 
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Causative Agent and Control in the Two Inaugural Outbreaks (52; 93) Ebola was 
identified as the causative agent in the first two outbreaks when the virus was isolated 
from patients from Sudan and Zaire. Analysis showed that two distinct subtypes, the 
Sudan Ebolavirus strain and Zaire Ebolavirus strain, caused the Sudan and Zaire 
outbreaks respectively. After the identification of this new pathogen, a team from the 
Center For Disease Control joined a group of international scientists to investigate and 
control the outbreak in Zaire. The team was known as International Commission for the 
Investigation and Control of Ebola Hemorhagic Fever in Zaire. It was this group that 
gave the virus the name Ebola, a namesake of the Ebola River, which runs in 
Northwestern DRC, close to where the outbreak occured (52; 94; 95). 
 
Containment of the Outbreaks (94) There were several factors that contributed to the 
successful termination of the first outbreak in Zaire. Al Commission activities and 
logistics were coordinated with the sole intention of ending the outbreak. They 
maintained open channels of communication with the Minister of Health of Zaire: they 
met with him daily to share information, to update him on progres, and to delineate 
upcoming action plans. Team members also worked closely with local leaders, explaining 
what they knew and promised to remain in the area until the outbreak was over. Teams 
went into the field immediately to find and isolate active cases and trace contacts. They 
also made recommendations and advised on abbreviated funeral rites that limited 
transmission of the virus while preserving the cultural context of traditional burial 
practices.  
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However, it was reported by the team that the most effective mechanism to 
control and end the outbreak was house-to-house visits. While the ostensible purpose of 
these visits was to trace contacts and find new cases, they were also imperative to 
establish trust with local communities. Many infected patients and their contacts fled out 
of fear of the disease and out of suspicion of Western medicine, opting instead to seek 
treatment from traditional healers. An outbreak cannot be ended if patients are 
transmiting the disease out of the reach of infection control and in an atempt to assuage 
uneasiness and distrust, clinicians from the local university hospital were included as an 
integral part of the international teams. By the time the Commission was disbanded at the 
end of the outbreak, they had visited 550 vilages at least twice over a 2-month period 
and a third visit was made in the vilages where Ebola was found. 
 
Evidence of Endemic Ebola in the Two Inaugural Outbreaks (51) Although the 
outbreaks in 1976 were the first Ebola outbreaks on record, it is possible that there had 
been earlier Ebola occurences in remote regions of Africa and outside epidemiologic 
surveilance. A retrospective investigation from a single, isolated Zaire Ebola case in 
1977 led researchers to believe that there was a possibility that Ebola Virus Disease was 
endemic, but sporadic, in the Northern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo since 
1972. 
The investigation began when a single Ebola case presented in Mission Hospital 
in Tandala, Zaire in June 1977. The patient was a nine-year-old girl who lived with her 
family in Bonduni Vilage, 20 km from Tandala, on the border of Zaire and the Central 
Africa Republic. She was admited to the hospital after she developed fever, abdominal 
pain and hematemesis. She was clinicaly diagnosed with Zaire Ebolavirus, immediately 
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isolated, and standard barier care methods were implemented. Her family did not report 
that they had traveled outside of the vilage before she became il; no one else in her 
family or in her vilage sufered from a similar ilness for up to four weeks before the 
onset of the litle girl’s symptoms; and there were no secondary cases identified among 
her contacts. Her family members were tested after the litle girl’s death and blood and 
serum analysis revealed that none of them had anti-Ebola antibodies.  
A retrospective investigation of hospital records revealed that there was one other 
patient, a 12-year-old girl from Bowabili, 30 km south of Tandala, who had been treated 
for febrile hemorhagic disease five months later in November 1977.  This child’s litle 
sister had also been il at the same and serological testing on the litle sister revealed that 
she had Ebola antibodies, although no other family members did. Furthermore, it was 
also found that a physician from Tandala Hospital, where both girls were treated, also had 
Ebolavirus antibodies. It is suspected that he contracted the disease when he lacerated a 
finger while performing an autopsy in 1972 on a patient who died of hemorhagic ilness. 
The doctor became sick 12 days after the autopsy with symptoms consistent with Ebola, 
but he recovered approximately 10 days after fever onset. Furthermore, analysis of 
vilagers in a 40 km radius of Tandala showed that 7% of those tested (79 people) had 
antibodies to Ebolavirus although none of them gave a history of clinical Ebola Virus 
Disease.  
The nine-year-old girl, the twelve-year-old girl and the doctor had no connections 
either to each other or to the original outbreak in Zaire in 1976; their infections were 
neither a result of nosocomial transmission nor household transmission. Consequently, 
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researchers surmised that Ebola may have been circulating in the region as early as 1972 
and could be endemic. 
 
1995 – 1996 Zaire Ebolavirus Outbreaks 
 
Kikwit, 1995 (96; 101) After 1977, the virus went ‘silent’ for 15 years, with no outbreaks 
recorded until the Zaire strain emerged in Kikwit, Democratic Republic of Congo from 
January – July 1995. The index patient was thought to be a 42-year-old man who came 
into contact with the virus’ unknown natural reservoir while working in a charcoal pit. He 
became il on January 6, 1995 and was admited into Kikwit General Hospital on January 
13. He transmited the virus directly to three immediate family members; ten of his 
extended family members were identified as secondary cases over the next nine weeks. 
These initial cases and their contacts spread the virus throughout the community via 
person-to-person and funeral transmission.  
The chain of infection eventualy led to Kikwit Maternity Hospital in mid-March 
when there was a smal nosocomial outbreak, initialy diagnosed as dysentery, among 
nine employees. Towards the end of April, there were cases of Ebola reported among the 
surgical staf at Kikwit General Hospital, al of which were traced back to a surgery that 
was performed on a lab technician who was employed at the Maternity Hospital. 
The virus was also introduced into Kikwit General by two other sources. The first 
was through a nurse from the Maternity Hospital who was admited into Kikwit General 
as a patient after she was nosocomialy exposed by an obstetric patient; the second 
introduction into Kikwit General was through an obstetric nurse who was exposed while 
caring for a cesarean patient. By the end of the outbreak, there were 315 cases and 256 
deaths, 25% of whom were health care providers.  
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It is thought that the lag time between the presentation of the first cases and 
investigation of the disease fueled the growth of this outbreak. A local ad-hoc commitee 
responsible for investigating the outbreak wasn’t formed until May 1, 1995, five months 
after the index case, and it was tasked to investigate an epidemic of dysentery deaths, not 
Ebola. It was only after the commitee consulted with a member of the Ministry of Health 
of the Democratic Republic of Congo, J.J. Muyembe-Tamfum, who had worked on the 
1976 outbreak, that Ebola was even considered as a possible causative agent. Samples 
from 14 patients were sent to the Center For Disease Control in early May; Ebola was 
confirmed as the cause of the outbreak on May 9, 1995. At that point, international teams 
were brought in to manage, control and end the outbreak.  
Identifying cases and tracing contacts proved to be chalenging considering that 
no public health surveilance infrastructure in Kikwit existed. There were other obstacles 
as wel: there were no telephones and very few transportation options. There was a 
propensity for patients to hide, deny or otherwise conceal their ilness for fear of stigma. 
Health education was hampered by the lack of mass media, so information campaigns 
were roled out using flyers, posters, banners and broadcast messages via megaphone in 
the streets. As rudimentary as the methods implemented may have been, they worked. On 
July 16, the last Ebola patient died, only a few months after the CDC and international 
health community were caled in. Their quick success reafirmed that education, 
surveilance and the use of proper barier-nursing practices can interupt Ebola 
transmission rapidly and efectively. 
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Figure Eight: Location of Ebola Outbreaks since 1976 
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Zaire 1990’s (98; 99) There were three other Zaire Ebola outbreaks in the mid 1990’s, 
all of which occured in northeastern Gabon (see Figure Nine). The first occured in two 
separate waves in December 1994 and January 1995 in and around Mekouka, Gabon, a 
town located close to the border of Cameroon. The first wave of Ebola cases originated in 
three gold mining camps located at the edge of a rainforest when 32 miners became il. 
They traveled 100 km by river to the hospital in Makoku to seek treatment where they 
were initialy diagnosed with Yelow Fever and immediately vaccinated. Retrospective 
testing of samples from those patients revealed that Zaire Ebolavirus was the causative 
agent. Against medical advice, one of the miners checked himself out of the hospital to 
seek care from a local traditional healer (a nganga) in the nearby vilage of Mayela. The 
escaped patient and the nganga were responsible for the second wave of 16 cases. Each 
one of the 16 could trace the transmission event back to caring for a relative in the 
hospital, sleeping at the nganga’s home or close contact with individuals who were 
employed at the hospital. By the time the outbreak burned itself out, there were 51 cases 
and 31 deaths.  
While the zoonotic reservoir for this outbreak was not identified, there were 
reports of a large number of deaths in a local population of gorilas and an anecdotal tale 
from one of the patients regarding a bizarely behaved chimpanzee that was later kiled. 
Neither story could be verified with gorila cadavers or skeletons in the forest in question. 
No animals colected in the area surounding the gold mines revealed Ebola infection, but 
mines are a known habitat for bats. 
The second Zaire Ebolavirus epidemic in Gabon occured in early February 1996 
in the vilage of Mayibout 2, Gabon, which lies in between Mékouka and Andock (the 
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location of the gold mines where the first epidemic broke out) and Makokou (where the 
patients from the gold mines were treated). The outbreak is thought to have begun when 
18 people caried and helped butcher a chimpanzee carcass that they found in the forest. 
It was said that the meat was roted and the chimpanzee appeared to be il before it died. 
After handling the meat, the patients and their contacts became il with fever, headache, 
bloody diarhea and were sent to Makokou Hospital, despite governmental instructions to 
the contrary. The bodies of the 4 patients were returned by river to Mayibout2; a fifth 
patient, who escaped from the hospital while symptomatic, died when he returned home 
to Mayibout2. The bodies of the initial patients were buried according to traditional burial 
ceremonies and without any special precautions to avoid viral transmission. The disease 
eventualy spread to the neighboring vilages of MayiboutI and Mvadi before it ended. By 
the end of the outbreak, 31 cases were identified and 21 of them died. 
The third outbreak occured in Booue, Gabon 120 km southwest of Mekouka, as 
early as July 13, 1996 when a 39 year-old hunter in a logging camp became il with Ebola 
like symptoms. Six weeks later in the end of August, a second hunter died with similar 
symptoms and 12 days after that a third hunter was taken to the hospital. The third patient 
left the hospital to seek treatment from an nganga in the nearby vilage of Balimba, where 
he died. The nganga and his nephew and some of his other patients also became infected 
and spread the disease to towns and vilages in the surounding area. The zoonotic link 
was never formaly identified, but several chimpanzee carcasses were found in the forest 
areas at the time of the human outbreaks, and tissue samples from one of them tested 
positive for Ebola antigens.  
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This outbreak was not only contained to the Gabon. A physician who performed 
an endoscopy on an Ebola patient from Booue became il. Apparently unaware that he 
had contracted Ebola, he flew to Johannesburg, South Africa for treatment, where he 
infected a nurse who cared for him. There were no other know cases associated with the 
Johannesburg nurse or the doctor. The epidemic was declared over in Gabon in March 
1997, with a total of 60 cases and 45 deaths. 
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Figure Nine: Geographical locations of the 1995-1996 
Zaire Ebolavirus outbreaks in Gabon (99).  
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Zaire Gabon/Democratic Republic of Congo 2000-2004 (98; 100) The period of 2000 
– 2004 saw several outbreaks of Zaire Ebolavirus (see Figure Ten). The first outbreak 
was in the area surounding the city of Mekambo, Gabon, which is located where Gabon 
and the Republic of Congo share a border. Rather than one large epidemic of human to 
human transmission events that can be traced back to one zoonotic spilover event, the 
cases of Ebola that occured from October 2001 – May 2002 in Mekambo area were a 
series of independent outbreaks stemming from six diferent spilover events, each of 
which were related to hunting.  
The first spilover occured in the vilage of Mendemba in Gabon on October 21, 
2001 when a hunter handled an antelope carcass that he found. At the time of his 
presentation to the hospital with febrile symptoms, the index case did not draw the 
atention of health authorities as a possible Ebola patient and was not diagnosed as such. 
It is unclear what his diagnosis was, but he was retrospectively diagnosed with Ebola. 
This initial case generated several secondary infections, but the disease did not draw the 
notice of regional health authorities until six members of the same family fel il and died 
over a three-week period. On November 30, samples from this family were sent to France 
for analysis; Zaire Ebolavirus was identified as the causative agent on December 8, at 
which point the WHO was notified. In the folowing days and weeks there were several 
more suspected Ebola patients being admited to Mekambo Hospital as wel as to 
Mekouka Hospital, most likely the result of community based and nosocomial 
transmission. Additionaly, there were reports of 20 dead gorilas and four chimpanzees 
in the rainforest of the same district. 
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The second transmission event occured on November 28, 2001 in the vilage of 
Ekata in Gabon when hunters manipulated an antelope; the third transmission event 
occured on December 1 in Oloba, Democratic Republic of Congo when hunters 
butchered a gorila carcass. Three weeks later the fourth transmission event happened in 
Ekata on December 22 from an unknown source; the fifth on December 29 in 
Etakangaye, Gabon when hunters handling a chimpanzee carcass became exposed. The 
sixth identified zoonotic transmission event occured on March 27, 2002 when hunters 
from Grand-Etoumbi butchered and ate a gorila carcass they found in the forest. By the 
end of these sequential outbreaks that took place from October 2001 – March 2002 there 
were 65 cases and 53 dead in Gabon and 57 cases and 43 dead in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. Al but two cases were epidemiologicaly linked to an oficial chain 
of transmission. Two gorilas that were butchered by one of the index cases in this series 
of spilover events were found positive for Ebola, but these were the only animals 
positively identified as being infected.  
  







The second of the Zaire Ebolavirus outbreaks that occured from 2000 – 2004 
afected the area surounding Mbomo. There were two zoonotic events, one in 
Yembelengoye and another in a gold-mining camp in Mvoula folowing the handling of 
animal carcasses. From December 2002 to May 2003, there were 143 cases and 128 
deaths associated with this outbreak. The third outbreak to occur during this period was 
in Mbanza, Democratic Republic of Congo when cases from an unknown source were 
reported between October and December 2003. There were 35 cases and 29 deaths. 
Figure Ten Map of the border region of Gabon and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo; the site of six independent Ebola spilover events from 
October 2001 – May 2002. (98) 
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Zaire in Democratic Republic of Congo 2007 (54) The last large Zaire Ebolavirus 
outbreak to occur before the 2014 Ebola epidemic occured from May - November 2007 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The epicienter of the outbreak was located in a 
colection of 10 vilages that are setled on the road between Luebo and Mweka (see 
Figure Eleven). Unlike in past outbreaks in Central Africa, there were no reports of 
simultaneous mortality among non-human primates or other fauna in the forests adjacent 
to the outbreak epicenter. 
There was bat activity around the time that this outbreak began. Each year 
thousands of fruit bats migrate southeast up the Lulua River towards Angola and Zambia 
and roost for a month on the islands of Ndongo and Koumuelele. There is also a palm oil 
plantation close to the river and though it is dormant, it is stil a place where bats can feed 
undisturbed. It is during this roosting period that hunters are known to kil the bats and 
sel them for food. The behavior of index patient was retrospectively traced to his 
purchase and consumption of freshly kiled bats. 
 The index case in this outbreak was a man from Bamoukama2 vilage who 
regularly bought bats for consumption at the Mombo Mounee2 market and reporting 
having regular contact with bat blood. He developed very mild symptoms (a headache 
and a fever) and did not die (it also appears that his wife did not become il either), but he 
did transmit the virus to his four year-old daughter who fel il with vomiting, diarhea 
and high fever on June 12, 2007 and died four days later. The child was given a 
traditional funeral, in which the body is washed and touched by mourners. One of the 
women who assisted in the preparation of the body was a 55 year-old woman who 
became il with typical Ebola symptoms and died on July 3, 2007. Eleven of her family 
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members also became il and died.  From this cluster of cases the virus spread throughout 
the community. 
 Given the remote location of the outbreak (vilages in this community are three-
four hours away from the main road and only accessible by motorbike or by foot), and 
the delayed detection of cases, the international response did not begin until September 
2007. Ebola was not determined to be the causative agent until September 10, 2007. It 
was never confirmed if the index case, his daughter or any of the earliest cases in the 
outbreak did indeed have Ebola. Ebola was identified as the causative agent on 
September 10, 2007 from samples that were colected on August 22, 2007. By the end of 
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      Source: htp:/online.liebertpub.com/doi/abs/10.1089/vbz.2008.0167 
 
 
and clinical information on each case was colected by inter-
viewing survivors, family members, and key informants, and
by holding focus group discussions. Data were also colected
by comprehensive review of available patient files from the
Kampungu MSF clinic or from healthcare centers, as appro-
priate. Data on each patient were recorded on a standardized
Ebola investigation form that included the patient’s identity,
clinical manifestations, treatment, the likely mode of infection,
and any laboratory results. With the patient’s verbal consent
the geographic position of the house was recorded using a
GPS device.
We also interviewed vilagers about the diferent mam-
malian species present in the area and the number found dead
or sick in the forest. We recorded dietary habits and hunting
protocols with the vilagers during focus group discussions.
Pictures of animals known to be possible carriers of Ebola
virus (rodents, monkeys, etc.) were used to facilitate their
identification by the native population.
This study was part of an Ebola outbreak control operation
coordinated by MoH, and no ethics commitee approval was
considered necessary, as usual in this kind of emergency sit-
uation. The family members and surviving patients were in-
formed that this report would be published, and that their
privacy would be preserved. Given the situation of Occidental
Kasaı̈in DRC, we had no way of sending them a hard copy of
the manuscript for approval, but the MoH authorities (a co-
signatory of the paper) gave their approval.
Results
The outbreak
An Ebola outbreak occurred in the Occidental Kasaı̈
province of DRC between May and November 2007 (Fig. 1).
The epicenter was an agglomeration of 10 vilages situated on
the north-south road linking Luebo and Mweka, about
200 km from the location of the 1995 outbreak in Kikwit, a
town located on the river Kwilu (Fig. 1). Epidemiological in-
vestigations conducted by the DRC MoH and international
teams showed that this outbreak might have caused 264
suspected cases including 186 deaths. The first case probably
occurred in May. However, the extreme inaccessibility of the
afected area delayed the detection of the outbreak and the
mobilization of control teams. The virus was detected on 10
September 2007 in samples that had been colected on 22
August and sent to both the Centre International de Re-
cherches Médicales de Francevile (CIRMF) in Gabon and
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention(CDC) in
Atlanta, USA. The international response was launched in
FIG. 1. Locationofthe 2007 Ebola outbreak n DRC. The Kampungu agglomeration is situatedalong the main road between
Luebo and Mweka vilages. The old vilages are located in the forested section between the road and Lulua River. Lulua
River, oriented north-south, corresponds to the bat migration flyway, including the islands where they setled for a few
weeks before and during the human outbreak.
EBOLA OUTBREAK FROM FRUIT BATS 725
Figure Eleven. Location of the 2007 Ebola Zaire Ebolavirus outbreak. Each of the 10 
vilages has a twin vilage in the forest zone. In essence each vilage has two parts, one 
in the forest (vilage 1), and the other near the road (vilage 2). Vilages2 offer 
healthcare, education, civil services, shops, and markets. Vilages1 agricultural and 
animal products to vilages2, where they are sold in the markets. The main market is 
held every Monday in Mombo Muonene 2. It is on the trail from vilages Bamoukama 1 
and 2 where it is speculated that the father carried his daughter on his back and possibly 
transmited Ebola. (54) 
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Sudan Ebolavirus (101; 122) Although not as prevalent as Zaire Ebolavirus, the Sudan 
Ebolavirus strain has caused six outbreaks since 1976 including the largest Ebola 
outbreak ever recorded prior to 2014. It began in late August, 2000 in Uganda when the 
first presumptive case was identified as having Ebola-like symptoms. However, the 
outbreak wasn’t noticed or reported to the Ministry of Health in Kampala until October 8, 
2000 when a cluster of cases was identified in St. Mary’s Hospital in Lacor, Sudan. The 
outbreak region was large: the virus found its way from the epicenter in Gulu to Massindi 
and Mbarara; an area that covered 31000 sqkm and 1.8 milion people. The last case was 
reported on January 9, 2001 and as of January 23 were 428 cases and 173 deaths. 
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West African Outbreak 2014 
Chronology  
January - March 2014 The outbreak in West Africa began slowly in the remote regions 
of Guinea in December 2013, but it didn’t take long for it to escape the confines of 
Guinea and fan out into Siera Leone, Liberia, Mali and Nigeria (6; 7). Retrospective 
analysis revealed that the putative index case was a two-year-old boy in Meliandou, a 
vilage in the city of Gueckedou, Guinea (208; 212). It is unclear how he became 
infected, but it is thought that he was exposed to the virus through the handling of bats. 
The manner in which the virus was transmited to the index notwithstanding, the chain of 
human-to-human transmission has not been broken since the primary spilover event in 
December.  As of March 35, 2015 there have been 24,907 suspected and probable cases 
and 10, 329 confirmed deaths, making this outbreak the largest Ebola epidemic ever 
recorded (98). 
While the outbreak was in its embryonic stages in the early months of 2014, cases 
began to mount in hospitals in Gueckedou, Macenta and Kissidougou. Physicians initialy 
suspected that cholera was the causative agent and while there were several patients who 
did test positive for the disease (128; 208). Befuddled doctors soon became suspicious 
that the ilness in question was not cholera (2; 3) but rather some kind of ‘mystery 
disease,’ and The Ministry of Health of Guinea was notified about a circulating disease 
that was characterized by fever, diarhea, vomiting and high mortality (3). On March 14, 
2014, a Ministry of Health team was sent to Gueckendou to investigate and two weeks 
later, Zaire Ebolavirus was identified as the causative agent. On March 23, 2014, the 
World Health Organization in Geneva was oficialy notified of the outbreak (1). At that 
Figure Twenty-three: The three Guinea strains placed in context with strains from past 
outbreaks along with strains captured from infected gorilas in the Lassa Sanctuary in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. As with the phylogentic trees in Figure 22, this 
analysis shows a divergence from the closest strains found in the Congo outbreak of 
2007.  
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point in time there were 86 cases and 59 deaths in the Gueckedou, Macenta, Nzerekore 
and Kissidougo districts of Guinea (124) (unless otherwise noted, case and death talies 
include confirmed, suspected and probable). See Figure Twelve 
 





Figure Twelve. From its beginnings in the smal vilage of Meliandou in southeastern 
Guinea, Ebola spread to the neighboring regions of Kissidougou and Macenta, but it 
was only a mater of weeks before the virus made its way in the capital city of 
Conkary (127) and into the Lofa district in neighboring Liberia (125). This map 
represents the state of viral spread as of March 24, 2014. While there were suspected 
cases at this time in Sierra Leone, they were ultimately diagnosed as Lassa Fever. 
Ebola was not confirmed in Sierra Leone until May 2014 (138).  
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By the end of March, Ebola left the confines of rural Guinea and crossed borders. 
On March 27, 2014, Ebola spread to Conkary, the capital of Guinea when four men who 
had atended their brother’s funeral in the central Guinean town of Dabola returned to 
city and began to exhibit symptoms consistent with Ebola. While al four tested positive 
for the virus, it was not confirmed if the dead brother had Ebola himself, although he did 
exhibit symptoms of hemorhagic fever before he died (210; 211; 125).  
On March 29, 2014, Ebola was first recorded in Liberia when seven suspected 
cases were detected in the Foya district of Lofa County. Two of these cases tested 
positive for Ebola, one of whom, a 35-year-old woman, became il after she returned 
from a trip to Guinea, where she presumably contracted the virus. Before she died on 
March 31, 2014 she was cared for by her sister, who in turn became sick herself. It is 
unknown if the sister also traveled to Guinea and contracted the virus there or if she was 
exposed through direct contact with her sister in Liberia (125; 126). 
 Around the same time, a second woman brought Ebola into Lofa County after 
she visited a Guinean market (119). She developed symptoms consistent with Ebola 
while she was in Guinea, at which point her sister traveled from Liberia to pick her up 
and brought her home. Eventualy, the sick sister was admited into Foya-Borma Hospital 
where she died on March 20, 2014. Soon after, the sister became symptomatic, and 
concerned about her condition, took a taxi to see her husband who was migrant worker at 
the Firestone rubber plant located outside of Monrovia, the capital of Liberia (population 
one milion people). The sister was symptomatic during the 12-hour taxicab ride (a 360 
km journey) from Lofa County to Monrovia and exposed the driver as wel as five other 
people along the way, al of whom later died of the virus. After she arived in Monrovia, 
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she caught a ride by motorcycle to Firestone (the fate of the bike driver remains 
unknown) (132) where she was hospitalized. On March 30, 2014, Firestone alerted the 
Liberian Ministry of Health that there was an active case of Ebola on the 120,000-acre 
plantation. On April 1, 2014 the woman’s husband and children were put under 
quarantine, and although one of the children developed Ebola-like symptoms, no one in 
the family ever tested positive for the virus. 
After Ebola was oficialy identified, the WHO headquarters in Geneva sent 
thirty-eight epidemiologists, logisticians and data managers (124; 127) to suport the 
search and management of cases across the entirety of the southeastern region of Guinea. 
The WHO West African Regional Ofice in Brazzavile, Congo primary task was to 
deploy personnel to afected regions to support the eforts of Ministries of Health and to 
guide control eforts on the ground. To that end, together they began making needs 
assessments and implementing a coordinated response to the outbreak (124; 127). The 
Ministry of Health of Guinea established an isolation facility in Gueckedou, and Rapid 
Response Teams in Conkary conducted contact tracing and ‘sensitized’ health care 
workers and afected vilagers about Ebola and how to reduce transmission (124; 127). 
After cases were detected in Liberia, a National Task force was established to lead the 
response that included members of the WHO, the International Red Cross, Samaritan’s 
Purse, Pentecostal Mission Unlimited and UNICEF (125). The team worked together to 
distribute Personal Protective Equipment to 41 health care facilities; to strengthen 
infection prevention and control protocols in Foya Hospital; and to train health care 
workers in Montserado County on how to treat and isolate Ebola patients. Personal 
protective equipment and medical supplies were also sent to Bong and Nimba counties 
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(127). However, rather than appointing Dr. Piere Formety, the WHO’s top Ebola 
authority as the coordinator of the regional response, the West African ofice chose an 
oficial from the Guinea WHO Ofice who had never before been involved in an Ebola 
outbreak (3). 
Médecins Sans Frontières, Switzerland (MSF) was already working in the field in 
Gueckedou on a malaria project when the outbreak began in Gueckedou and immediately 
stepped in to care and treat Ebola patients (3). MSF has a long history of handling 
hemorhagic disease outbreak control eforts in Africa (source: msf.org). They were on 
the ground in Kikwit in 1995; Gabon in 1997, 2001 and 2002; the Democratic Republic 
of Congo in 2002, 2005, and 2007; Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo in 
2012; Uganda for the Bundibugyo outbreak in 2008; and Durba, Democratic Republic of 
Congo for a Marburg outbreak in 1999. They also had a pivotal role in the control eforts 
during the outbreak in Gulu, Uganda in 2000-2001. 
By the end of March 2014, MSF had 60 international doctors, nurses, logisticians 
and hygiene and sanitation experts working in MSF-run Ebola Treatment Centers in 
Gueckedou, Macenta and Conkary, Guinea. They sent 40 tons of equipment to Guinea 
including medicines, medical equipment and the supplies that were needed to isolate 
patients, put sanitation measures in place and to protect health care workers. MSF also 
provided logistical support to the Liberian Ministry of Health in Monrovia. In addition to 
caring for patients who were showing signs of infection, MSF teams were tracing 
contacts and educating communities on the disease itself and infection control (129). 
MSF was keenly aware that the geographical spread of the disease in West Africa 
far exceeded that of previous outbreaks and that there was the potential for the epidemic 
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to spiral out of control. In a press release issued on March 31, 2014 the organization 
warned that West Africa was “facing an epidemic of a magnitude never before seen in 
terms of the distribution of cases in the country.” In particular, they were concerned about 
the unusual spread of the disease into urban setings “because it wil greatly complicate 
the tasks of the organizations working to control the epidemic” (129). In response to 
MSF’s warning, on April 1, Gregory Hartl of WHO responded that the outbreak was 
“relatively smal stil” and cautioned the use of alarmist rhetoric saying “we must be 
careful with how words are used… for now what we see are sporadic cases, we cannot 
cal it an epidemic” (128). 
 
April 2014 (130; 131; 132; 133; 134; 135; 136) Transmission throughout the month of 
April was localized, but intense. In Guinea, the transmission appeared to be actively 
contained in Conkary, Gueckedou, Macenta, Kissidougou, Dabola, and Djingaraye; while 
in Liberia, the majority of reported cases were in Lofa and Margibi counties (38% and 
27% respectively), with Bong, Nimba, Montserado and Grand Cape Mount reporting 
fewer, but consistent, cases. 
Forty-four more experts were deployed to Guinea, Liberia and Siera Leone 
(130), for a total of 50 across the region (134) but it appeared that the majority of the 
control eforts embarked upon by the regional WHO ofices and the national 
governments of Liberia, Siera Leone and Guinea revolved around holding meetings, 
making assessments, and developing preparedness plans (134). On April 2, the Chief 
Medical Oficer of Liberia visited Lofa County and held meetings with local government 
oficials (132; 134). The National Task Force in Liberia conducted daily coordination 
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meetings with response partners (133). The WHO Country Ofice in Liberia conducted a 
needs assessment with the Ministry of Health in order to get a handle on equipment and 
materials gaps (133). The Ministry of Foreign Afairs of Guinea met with the Minister of 
Health, local WHO representatives, although the content of the meeting was not reported 
(135). There was a cross border meeting between Liberia and Guinea where 
epidemiological surveilance and contact tracing along borders were discussed (136). 
By the end of April, Guinea reported 58 cases and 24 deaths in Conkary; 127 
cases and 91 deaths in Gueckedou; 22 cases and 16 deaths in Macenta; six cases and five 
deaths in Kissidougou; and four cases and four deaths in Dabola (136). In Liberia most of 
the 35 cases were in Foya, which was, at that time, considered the epicenter of the 
outbreak in Liberia. Although there had been several suspected cases in Siera Leone in 
March, April and May, most of those turned out to be Lassa Fever (134). 
 
  Guinea Liberia 
 Cases Deaths Cases Deaths 
March (131) 122 80 8 2 
April  (136) 218 141 35 Not reported 
 
 
May 2014 Throughout the later days of April and into the middle part of May, it 
appeared that the outbreak was under control. Although incident case counts were 
increasing, growth wasn’t explosive. Gueckedou was the only area in Guinea where the 
active transmission of the disease was stil being reported. By May 18, two incubation 
periods (42 days) had passed since the isolation of the last reported cases in Djinguiraye, 
Dabola and Kissidougou. In Macenta, there had not been any new cases since April 9, 
2014 and Conakry had not seen any new cases since April 26, 2014. There were not any 
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recorded cases in Siera Leone and Liberia had only 12 total cases and nine deaths with 
al suspected contacts and patients in isolation since April 9. The WHO was confident 
enough to declare that the Ebola outbreak would be over in Liberia by May 22, 2014 
(137). 
Those sanguine predictions were to be very short-lived. On May 29, one week 
after the WHO predicted the end of the outbreak, The Ministry of Health in Siera Leone 
and the WHO reported sixteen cases in the Koindu chiefdom in the Kailahun District, 
which lies on the border with Guinea (see Figure 13) (138). The first recorded case was a 
young woman with hemorhagic symptoms who traveled from Koindu to Kenema 
Government Hospital on May 23, 2014. She had a miscariage and was also suspected of 
having Lassa Fever. Further investigation revealed that she had recently atended a 
funeral of a traditional healer who was treating Ebola patients in Guinea. While no 
nosocomial transmission was oficialy reported from this one female patient, there were 
13 other women who contracted Ebola from that funeral, al of whom brought the virus 
into Siera Leone (138). There is thought to have been at least four diferent clusters of 
cases identified among these 13 women, and the contacts of these clusters are believed to 
have spread the virus throughout Siera Leone to Kenema, Bo, Daru, Kailahun, and the 
Pehe Bongre, and Jawai Chiefdoms in the eastern district of the country (139). 
By the end of May, there were 291 cases and 193 deaths in Guinea; 50 cases and 
six deaths in Siera Leone and while there were cases in Liberia, the numbers were not 
reported due to “changes in reclassification, retrospective investigation, consolidation of 
cases and laboratory data, and enhanced surveilance” (140). In addition, on May 2, the 
WHO began reclassifying past case talies due to consolidation of case, contact and 
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laboratory data, enhanced surveilance activities, and contact tracing activities. 
Furthermore, the recent introduction of Ebolavirus serology to test RT-PCR negative 
clinical cases also changed the final number of laboratory confirmed cases. Therefore, the 
case and death numbers reported did not increase or decrease in a linear manner over 
time.  
 
  Guinea Liberia Siera Leone 
 Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths 
March (131) 122 80 8 2   
April (136) 218 141 35 Unknown   
May (140) 291 193 Not available due to reclassification  50  6 
 
 
June 2014 On June 1, four days after the first cases in Siera Leone were recorded, there 
were a reported 79 cumulative cases and six deaths in the Kailahun, Kenema, Koinadugu, 
Bo and Moyamba districts in Siera Leone as wel as five cases in the capital of Freetown 
(140). On June 2, six suspected Ebola patients were taken out of the hospital by their 
families in Koindu, a town in the Kailahun District (191). Staf and doctors at the clinic 
had tried to stop the families, but they had been "aggressive" and apparently feared that 
their loved ones would die a lonely death. The removal of these infectious patients from 
isolation al but guaranteed that not only would the patients die without proper treatment, 
but also that the family members who cared for them would be exposed to the virus, as 
would anyone who also provided care and/or participated in their funerals. Furthermore, 
it was fairly likely that these cases fel outside of the Ebola surveilance parameters and 
escaped detection, which also means that al contacts of these six patients went 
unreported and unfolowed as wel, furthering the spread of disease in the community. 
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Source: htp:/www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/siera_leone_map.htm 
           
 
 
Figure Thirteen: Ebola finaly made it into Sierra Leone in late May 
after a group of 13 women atended the funeral of a natural healer in 
Guinea who was known to treat patients who had Ebola. The direct and 
peripheral contacts of these 13 women sparked the spread of the disease 
to Kenema, Bo, Daru, Kailahun, and the Pehe Bongre and Jawai 
Chiefdoms in the eastern district (138; 139). 
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In response to the surge of cases in Siera Leone, the WHO sent six international 
experts to Siera Leone to assist in the areas of coordination, epidemiology, social 
mobilization, case management/infection prevention and control, data management and 
logistics. There was just one isolation facility located in Kenema, but there were plans to 
build two more in Daru and Koindu (143). On June 3 2014, Guinea, Siera Leone and 
Liberia agreed to reinforce cross-border surveilance and communication tools to address 
community resistance (142). 
Meanwhile in Guinea, on June 1, 2014 it was reported that the virus had spread 
outward from Conkary into the previously untouched districts of Telimele (19 new cases 
and five deaths) and Bofa (two deaths), both of which are on the coast next to the capital 
(143). New cases continued to be reported in Conkary, Gueckedou and Macenta. In an 
efort to stem transmission in Guinea, the WHO redeployed five additional experts to the 
afected areas (142) to actively search for cases and folow-up with contacts and to 
establish isolation facilities in Télimélé. A team of social mobilization experts was also 
deployed to support public health awareness with an emphasis on addressing community 
resistance in some vilages (144). 
During the first weeks of June there were no new cases recorded in Liberia. Then 
from June 11 – June 16 nine new cases surfaced and five deaths were recorded in Lofa 
(144). On June 17, 2014 the first Ebola cases were recorded in Monrovia, Liberia when 
seven deaths were reported (145). Among them was a nurse who died in Redemption 
Hospital in the Monrovian slum of New Kru Town, who also infected four other people 
from her household. The detection of Ebola in Nu Kru Town may have been the tipping 
point for the explosion of cases in Liberia; living conditions in slums is conducive to the 
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spread of infectious disease: people live in very tight quarters, many share the same bed 
and sanitation is relatively non-existent due to the dearth of running water, toilets or 
electricity (128). 
On June 23, 2014, MSF released a statement declaring that the epidemic was out 
of control (146). The organization had reached their human capital limits and was unable 
to send more teams to new outbreak sites. They accused the WHO, civil, political and 
religious leaders of ‘failing to acknowledge the scale of the epidemic’ and shirking their 
responsibilities to curb the spread of the disease. By this point in time, MSF had treated 
470 patients in Ebola Treatment Centers in Conkary, Telimele and Gueckedou (Guinea); 
Koidu, Daru, Buedu and Kaiahun (Siera Leone); and Foya and JFK Hospital in 
Monrovia (Liberia). They were supporting the Ministries of Health of Liberia to conduct 
epidemiologic surveilance. As experienced as MSF was in treating patients and 
mounting outbreak control measures in Ebola zones, there were limits to what the 
organization could do on its own with the 300 staf they had working in West Africa. 
They faced human capital limitations and were having dificulties finding qualified state 
and international staf to treat and isolate patients, engage in contact tracing and mount 
awareness-raising activities in the community.  
At the end of June 2014, there were 413 cases and 313 deaths in Guinea, 107 
cases and 65 deaths in Liberia and 239 cases and 99 deaths in Siera Leone for a total of 
759 cases and 467 deaths among al three countries (147). The WHO pointed to the 
persistent failure in local communities to comply with recommended control measures 
for the accelerated resurgence of cases since May. In particular, the WHO cited the 
reluctance of patients to seek care in Ebola Treatment Centers and electing instead to be 
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cared for at home as the primary driver that was fueling household and community 
transmission of the virus. Cross border movement and trafic was also facilitating the 
wide geographic spread of the disease (148). 
 
  Guinea  Liberia  Siera Leone  
 Cases Deaths % Δ cases Cases Deaths % Δ 
cases 
Cases Deaths % Δ cases 
March (131) 122 80 --------- 8 2     
April (136) 218 141 73% 35      
May (140) 291 193 37% Not available  50  6 ----------- 














Figure Fourteen. This map shows the spread of Ebola in West Africa as of June 17, 
2014. Active cases were detected not only in the rural areas of Guinea, Liberia, and 
Sierra Leone but also in the capital cities of Conkary, Monrovia, and Freetown. The 
WHO cited several reasons for the widespread transmission of disease (148):  
1.Negative cultural practices that resulted in mistrust of public health messages, 
poor health care seeking behavior such as the hiding of patients, and traditional 
burial practices.  
2.Extensive movement of people across borders; 
3.Non-comprehensive containment procedures in the context of a weak health 
care infrastructure.  
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July 2014 The WHO convened a meeting in Accra, Ghana on July 2-3, 2014 to bring 
together the Ministries of Health from 11 countries (Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Senegal, 
Siera Leone, and Uganda) as wel as Ebola survivors, representatives of airlines and 
mining companies, and donor communities to analyze the situation in West Africa, to 
identify response gaps, to develop operational plans and to ensure increased political 
commitment and colaboration among countries. The objective was to “obtain consensus 
from Member States and partners represented on the optimal way of interupting the 
ongoing Ebola virus transmission in West Africa to reduce the human, social and 
economic impact of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa for the curent and future 
outbreaks” (148). 
As a result of that meeting, on July 31, the governments of Guinea, Liberia and 
Siera Leone and the WHO Regional Ofice in West Africa released the Ebola Virus 
Disease Outbreak Response Plan in West Africa (150). In it, the key players formaly 
requested that the WHO in Geneva would ‘lead and coordinate the international response 
to the outbreak.’ Among other things, they asked the WHO to provide leadership in 
coordination of international partners; to mobilize staf, experts, and consultants; to assist 
with training health care professionals on how to prevent nosocomial transmission; and to 
facilitate cross and inter country colaboration. The document also recognized the 
chalenges that the Ministries of Health faced in their eforts to control viral transmission, 
such as community participation, financial dificulties, cross border colaboration, and the 
inability to engage in the basic tenets of Ebola containment: infection prevention, 
isolation of patients, surveilance, and contact tracing. An operational plan based on 
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traditional outbreak protocols for controling transmission was outlined and immediate 
actions included placing a response team in each hot spot, strengthening clinical supports 
and security along borders, isolating symptomatic patients, tracing of al contacts for 21 
days, and distributing personal protective equipment supplies and materials. It was 
estimated that it would cost $100.5 milion USD to control the outbreak (with a funding 
gap of $71 milion USD) and the document beseeched the international community to 
donate additional human and material resources. 
The WHO mobilized resources on the ground during the month of July. A sub-
regional coordination center was set up in Conkary to implement the outbreak response 
and to identify and train community volunteers and supervisors (149). The local WHO 
ofices in West Africa also began working with the Global Outbreak Alert and Response 
Network (GOARN), a colaboration of institutions and networks that combine human and 
technical resources to rapidly respond to outbreaks, to provide technical expertise and to 
support to the Ministries of Health of Liberia, Siera Leone and Guinea in their eforts to 
control transmission of the virus (150). They deployed experts to work on surveilance 
and monitoring of the outbreak, to expedite laboratory confirmation of suspected cases, to 
isolate and treat patients, to dispatch and disseminate equipment and materials, and to 
train public health oficials on contact tracing and the handling of Ebola cases. 
The WHO worked directly with the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare of 
Liberia to identify and train 107 community volunteers and 33 supervisors. In Siera 
Leone, 296 community volunteers had been trained and were sent into the field to 
conduct contact tracing and to evacuate suspected Ebola cases from the community 
(149). In addition, Gambia provided 11 health care workers to support the response in 
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Siera Leone and the United States supplied personal protective equipment and other 
medical supplies (such as backpack sprayers and hand sprayers for disinfection as wel 
disposal bags for biohazard wastes) to Liberia in order to ensure the safety of health-care 
workers (151). 
As of July 24, 2014, MSF had 22 international and 250 local staf working in 
Siera Leone and had trained an additional 200 community health workers to deliver 
health messages to people in their vilages regarding self-protection and actions to take if 
one showed signs of the disease. In Liberia, MSF handed over the management of the 
Foya Ebola Treatment Center to Samaritan’s Purse, a non-profit organization, and opened 
a tented treatment center with capacity for 50 beds in Monrovia. Caseloads in Guinea had 
been declining at a steady pace and MSF was winding down their activity in Conkary and 
closed their Ebola Treatment Center in Telimélé. Although cases in Gueckedou were 
declining, MSF opined that this did not necessarily reflect an end to the outbreak, rather it 
was reflective of the significant fear surounding Ebola that caused infected people to 
hide in their homes. In response to this suspicion, MSF teams traveled to vilages to find 
and treat patients who remained at home, but they were met with hostility and violence. 
Consequently, MSF began working with local authorities and elders to try to ensure safe 
access so they could obtain a clearer picture of the number of people hidden in vilages 
and rural areas who were infected with and dying of the virus (154). 
It wasn’t until July 21, 2014 that Dr. Luis Sambo, the WHO Regional Director of 
the West African Region visited Guinea, Liberia and Siera Leone to make a first-hand 
assessment of the outbreak, review the curent response and to explore the best ideas and 
ways to control transmission of the virus (9). At the time of Dr. Sambo’s tour, Guinea 
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reported 427 cases and 314 deaths; Liberia reported 249 cases and 129 deaths; Siera 
Leone reported 525 cases and 224 deaths (a total of 1201 cases and 667 deaths) (152). 
During his trip, Dr. Sambo held meetings with the Ministries of Health and non-
governmental organizations and underscored the seriousness of the outbreak. He 
postulated that while Ebola could be contained using known infection control measures, 
the outbreak was at a scale such that control eforts exceeded the capabilities of any 
national health sector. He urged civil, societal and community responses to pool 
resources and work concurently with national staf to end transmission of the virus 
(152). 
Nigeria reported it’s first case of Ebola at the end of July (152). On July 17, a 
Liberian national, who had been hospitalized in Monrovia as a suspected Ebola patient, 
checked himself out of the hospital and flew from Monrovia to Lagos, a city of 21 
milion people, on July 20. It was reported that he was visibly il in the Monrovia airport 
and was lying on the floor at the departure gates. On the plane, which flew from 
Monrovia to Lagos via Accra, Ghana and Lome, Togo, he vomited several times and 
finaly colapsed on the tarmac at the Lagos airport. He was immediately driven to a 
private hospital (the protocol oficer who drove him later died from Ebola) where he told 
the atending physician he had malaria. He was unresponsive to malaria treatment and 
tested positive for Ebola. It was later discovered that his sister in Liberia was a confirmed 
case of Ebola and that he had visited her in the hospital and atended her funeral (154; 
155).  
The Liberian man, Patrick Sawyer, was working for, or traveling under the 
auspices of, the Liberian Ministry of Finance to atend a conference in Lagos. 
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Recolection of the chain of events that led to his departing Liberia vacilates: the 
Ministry of Health of Liberia contends that they unequivocaly told Mr. Sawyer that he 
was not to travel because he was under observation. The then-Deputy Minister for the 
Budget, Sebastian Muah said he had authorized the trip despite Mr. Sawyer’s condition, 
claiming medical ignorance. He later recanted that statement and contends that he never 
authorized his departure at al. Be that as it may, when Mr. Sawyer arived at the hospital 
in Lagos, he was in such an agitated, and perhaps confused state, that he demanded he be 
released, even going so far as to seek the help of high-ranking Liberian oficials, who 
alegedly pressured the hospital to release him so he could atend the conference. Mr. 
Sawyer died in Lagos on July 25 (154; 155; 156; 157). 
Ebola spread outside of Lagos on August 1, 2014 when a direct contact of the Mr. 
Sawyer’s in Lagos became il and flew Port Harcourt to seek medical care from a private 
doctor. The doctor who treated him developed symptoms on August 10 and died on 
August 23 (154). During his travels while symptomatic, Mr. Sawyer reportedly exposed 
72 people to the virus and from these, 898 peripheral contacts were identified. One 
hundred percent of the contact in Lagos and 99.8 percent of the contacts in Port Harcourt 
were folowed up for 21 days, generating 18,500 visits. The outbreak was declared over 
in Nigeria on October 20, 2014; a total of 19 cases (nine of whom were health care 
workers) were identified and eight people died (154; 155; 156). 
 The spread of the virus in such a densely populated city such as Lagos could have 
been disastrous. However, it was the rapid, thorough and vigorous response by the 
Nigerian government that made containment so successful. An Incident Management 
   90 
Center was established the same day that Mr. Sawyer was diagnosed, and al containment 
activities were organized and carried out from there. 
It wasn’t merely the establishment of the Center that accomplished the goal of 
eradicating of the virus. The Center, and the infrastructure that supported it, had been 
used to eradicate polio in Nigeria and those systems were reactivated to conduct contact 
tracing and to identify chains of transmission. Social mobilizers visited every house 
surounding the homes of Ebola contacts, a total of 26,000 houses, disseminating 
information about the virus. Al symptomatic or potentialy symptomatic patients were 
immediately isolated for further testing and if confirmed, moved immediately to Ebola 
Treatment Centers (154; 155; 157). 
 
Case Counts as of July 31, 2014 
  Guinea  Liberia  Sierra Leone  
 Cases Deaths %Δ 
cases 
Cases Deaths %Δ 
cases 
Cases Deaths %Δ 
cases 
Mar(131) 122 80 _____ 8 2     
April  (136) 218 141 73% 35      
May (140) 291 193 37% Not available  50  6 _____ 
June (147) 413 303 41% 107 65 ______ 239 99 378% 
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August 2014 In the first few days of August, Dr. Margaret Chan, the Director-General of 
the WHO, held meetings with the Presidents of Guinea, Liberia, and Siera Leone to 
review the status of the Ebola epidemic and create common strategies to eradicate the 
disease (63). On August 8, 2014, as there were 1779 cases and 961 deaths reported, the 
WHO declared that Ebola constituted a Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern (PHEIC)(159). 
This declaration was not merely ornamental; it was an instrument of the 
International Health Regulations and represented a legaly binding agreement made by 
196 countries to contain major international threats (9). The consequences of such a 
declaration are immediate. In part, it decreed that Ebola afected countries should declare 
a national emergency, activate national disaster-management mechanisms and establish 
emergency operations centers. There were definitive expectations on constraining 
mobility across borders and within them. International travel of infected persons or their 
contacts was forbidden and the reduction of movement in areas of intense transmission 
was expected to be enforced. 
The Agreement also contained recommended actions that afected countries were 
to implement in order to control the outbreak. These measures included directives on 
implementing control protocols such as contact tracing and monitoring. Local 
communities were to engage with religious and traditional leaders to provide information 
on the virus and how to prevent transmission. Infrastructure mandates included the 
distribution of personal protective equipment along with instruction on its proper use. 
Countries were also expected to provide clinical care and psychosocial support for al 
Ebola cases and to ensure that health care workers received timely payment of salaries 
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and hazard pay. Treatment centers were to be situated close to areas of transmission and 
have adequate numbers of trained staf and suficient equipment to handle caseloads. 
There were also specific instructions that dictated that funerals were to take place in the 
presence of fuly trained personnel while keeping families involved and respecting 
cultural practices. Finaly, there were provisions for extraordinary measures, such as 
quarantine and lock-downs, to be implemented (159). Indeed, quarantine was 
implemented in August in al three West African countries; in October in Liberia in the 
Grand Cape Mount District (234; 235); in September in Siera Leone when the Port Loko 
and Bombali districts were sealed of, restricting the movement of up to one milion 
people (236). In the beginning of September, Siera Leone enforced a three-day 
lockdown in which no one was permited to leave their houses so the government could 
conduct house-to-house searches (169). In those three days, 7000 teams went door to 
door and identified 358 cases and uncovered 265 corpses (237; 238). In December, 2014 
the northern part of Siera Leone was under another quarantine and public celebrations of 
the Christmas holidays was banned (239); in late March 2015, Siera Leone a second 
lockdown was implemented as oficials tried to find cases and stem the spread of the 
virus (240). While these actions could be perceived as draconian, even as they are 
alowed under the declaration of the Public Health Emergency of International Concern, 
they are not coercive (9). Rather, it was expected that any and al measures were to be 
introduced with the understanding and colaboration of afected communities. 
Nonetheless, the quarantine in the West Point Slum of Monrovia in August 2014 ended in 
violence, clashes with the police, and the death of one 16 year old child (128; 161; 209).  
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On August 28, a month after declaring the PHEIC, the WHO in Geneva released 
the Ebola Response Roadmap, a 20-page document in which the organization essentialy 
took control of the outbreak response considering that “a massively scaled and 
coordinated international response is needed to support afected and at risk countries in 
intensifying response activities and strengthening national capacities” (162). The plan 
provided the backbone that sustained the response in West Africa and the action items 
contained therein would assist governments with country-specific operational plans. 
Nothing in the plan was necessarily revelatory or novel and most of the action items 
merely reiterated containment activities that were known to stop Ebola transmission. 
However, particular atention was paid to the necessity of training health care workers on 
the training of health care workers on the proper use of personal protective equipment 
and the mobilization, hiring and training of health care workers across the board to 
provide care in Ebola Treatment Centers.  
Despite the fact that the WHO deployed 440 experts to the region, case totals in 
August were climbing. The Ministries of Health of Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, and Siera 
Leone reported an aggregate of 3475 cases and 1849 deaths; more than 40% of those 
occuring in the month of August alone. Of these, 257 were health care workers of whom 
140 have died (164). During this time, assistance from governments within Africa began 
trickling in. South Africa and Senegal deployed mobile laboratories to Siera Leone and 
Guinea. This was in addition to the labs provided by Canada, the Center for Disease 
Control and the Russian Federation (164). 
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Figure Fifteen (164): While transmission had been steady and consistent throughout the 
summer of 2014, transmission appeared to cross the Rubicon on weeks 34 and 35 (the 
weeks of August 18 and August 25) when there was a large spike in cases in Liberia and to 
a lesser extent Guinea and Sierra Leone.  
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Figure Sixteen (164): The spread of Ebola as of August 29, 2014. Sixty-two percent 
of the reported cases were found in Gueckedou, Guinea; Lofa, Liberia; and Kenema, 
Sierra Leone where transmission was first reported in each of the countries. Nine 
months after the beginning of the epidemic, transmission had not abated in the 
epicenters in each respective country. 
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Case Counts as of August 29, 2014 
 
  Guinea  Liberia  Sierra Leone  
 Cases Deaths %Δ 
cases 
Cases Deaths %Δ 
cases 
Cases Deaths %Δ 
cases 
Mar. (131) 122 80  8 2     
April (136) 218 141 73% 35      
May (140) 291 193 37% Not Available  50  6  
June (147) 413 303 41% 107 65  239 99 378% 
July (158) 472 346 14% 391 227 265% 574 252 140% 
Aug(164) 648 430 37% 1378 694 252% 1026 422 78.7% 
 
 
September 2014 By early September, MSF, frustrated with the dithering of the WHO 
and the non-existent international response to the epidemic, Dr. Joann Lui delivered a 
speech September 16 at a special briefing in Geneva of the UN Member States on the 
ebola outbreak and response in West Africa, in which she said she was “honestly at a loss 
as to how a single, private NGO [was] providing the bulk of isolation units and beds.” On 
September 2, 2014, MSF International President Dr. Joanne Liu gave a speech to the 
United Nation member states in New York City and chastised the international 
community for failing to address the epidemic in a real and substantive way: “despite 
cals by MSF for a massive mobilization on the ground, the international response has 
been inadequate” and that “states have essentialy joined a global coalition of 
inaction”(166). 
The situation on the ground in West Africa deteriorated during the month of 
September. In one week alone, Liberia reported 400 incident cases and Siera Leone 
reported 200 (167). The caseload in Liberia was primarily driven by a surge in 
transmission in the hotspots of Monrovia and to a lesser extent Lofa County, while the 
outbreak in Siera Leone was mainly contained to Freetown, the Kenema and Kailahun 
Districts as wel as Bo, Bombali and Port Loko. Guinea initialy saw an uptick in cases 
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in the beginning of August in Conkary, Macenta and Gueckendou, but by the end of 
September transmission was reported as sustained yet moderate (167; 168). 
The health care infrastructure continued to crumble under the weight of the 
increasing caseload. There were bed shortages in al three countries and even though 
national governments and international aid groups continued to build treatment centers, 
demand far outweighed supply. In the month of September, the Liberian government 
opened the 120-bed Island Clinic in Monrovia and a tented 40-bed Ebola Treatment 
Center in Bong County while the International Red Cross built a 60-bed treatment center 
in Kenema, Siera Leone (169; 170). MSF built a new Ebola Management Center in Bo, 
Siera Leone; ELWA3 in Monrovia; and a new facility in Foya. In total, MSF responded 
to the crisis with 258 international and 2800 localy hired staf who responded to the 
crisis in the field and provided care in six diferent Ebola Treatment Centers (170; 172). 
By the end of September, the WHO reported that although there were 893 beds 
available for patients in Ebola Treatment Centers across the region, there was stil a need 
for 2800 more (169). One of the obstacles to building more treatment centers was the 
disagreements between the Ministries of Heath and MSF regarding site selection in 
addition to the scarcity of qualified staf to run them (170). 
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    Source: htp:/www.msf.org/article/ebola-crisis-update-sept-25th 
 
During September, financial pledges from the international community started 
coming in. On September 16, the United States of America commited to building 17 
Ebola treatment centers (total capacity: 1,700 beds) in Liberia and to distributing 400,000 
Ebola home health and treatment kits. The US military also planned to send 
approximately 3000 troops to train 500 health care workers a week (213). Cuba sent 150 
medical personnel to Siera Leone; China sent medical supplies and a field laboratory to 
Figure Seventeen: (172) By September 25, 2014, MSF reported that they had 
admited 3299 patients since the beginning of the outbreak 650 of whom survived. 
The organization provided 549 beds across six Ebola Treatment Centers. 
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Liberia; France sent aid to Guinea while the United Kingdom pledged 700 beds in Siera 
Leone (171). 
 
Case Counts as of September 28, 2014 
  Guinea  Liberia  Sierra Leone  
 Cases Deaths %Δ 
cases 
Cases Deaths %Δ 
cases 
Cases Deaths %Δ 
cases 
Mar. (131) 122 80  8 2     
April (136) 218 141 73% 35      
May (140) 291 193 37% Not Available  50  6  
June (147) 413 303 41% 107 65  239 99 378% 
July (158) 472 346 14% 391 227 265% 574 252 140% 
Aug(164) 648 430 37% 1378 694 252% 1026 422 78.7% 
Sept (173) 1157 270 78.5% 3696 1639 168% 2304 884 125% 
 
 
October 2014 (174; 175; 176; 177) Ebola transmission continued unabated throughout 
the month of October. After months of steady, but not an explosive number of new cases 
in Guinea, transmission became intense once again. The city of Conkary remained a key 
area of concern and the districts of Macenta, Kerouane, and Nzerekore reported the 
highest number of new cases. The later two districts share a border with Cote D’Ivorie, 
which highlighted the need for increased border surveilance. The WHO reported that 
that there was a slowing of transmission in Gueckedou, where the outbreak began nearly 
a year earlier, but MSF described the situation much diferently (182). They reported that 
more patients were admited in October at their treatment centers than in the first eight 
months in operation. New cases were ariving every day in Gueckedou and 15 beds were 
added to accommodate demand.  
While several districts in Guinea remained Ebola-free, the disease was spreading 
to virgin districts. New cases were reported in Beyla and Lola, both of which share a 
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border with Cote D’Ivorie; Kankan, which is on a major route to Mali and also on the 
border of Cote D’Ivorie; and Faranah, a district in the center of Guinea that shares a 
border with Siera Leone. Boke, which resides in the Northern part of Guinea on the 
border of Guinea-Bissau, saw new cases of Ebola after a 21-day period of dormancy. 
Denial of Ebola and community resistance to humanitarian aid workers continued to be a 
problem in Guinea, and many families chose to keep suspected patients at home as a way 
to not only avoid treatment centers but also the mandatory cremation policy. 
Conditions in Liberia were deteriorating rapidly and transmission was 
widespread. The Ministry of Health consistently reported that there were up to 400 new 
cases a week throughout the month. By the end of October the city of Monrovia had a 
decrease in weekly new cases, but the true picture of the state of the epidemic remained 
murky, primarily because it was suspected by the WHO and other aid groups that cases 
were being vastly undereported and that there were breaches in data colection. It was 
thought that in any given week the suspected case counts were in fact definite cases due 
to the delay in matching lab results with surveilance data. 
Outside of Monrovia, the Liberian districts of Bong, Margibi, and Nimba (which 
shares a border with Cote D’Ivorie and Guinea) reported high transmission. After there 
were new cases reported in Grand Gadeh, every single district in Liberia had at least one 
case of Ebola. On the other hand, Lofa County, the district that reported the first cases in 
Liberia in Spring 2014, showed a consistent decrease in transmission.  
The situation in Siera Leone continued to get worse in October with over 400 
new cases a week. Transmission in Freetown, Kenema, Kailahun, Port Loki, Bombali and 
Moyamba was so aggressive that the government imposed quarantine in an efort to 
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curtail the surge of new cases. Checkpoints were set up to prevent the one – two milion 
people in the area from leaving the area. Surveilance systems were compromised and 85 
percent of helpline cals were not geting a response. There were not enough ambulances 
to transport patients and symptomatic people atempted to make their own way to get care 
and often died in transit, puting others at risk. The Kailahun Ebola Treatment Center was 
receiving patients from adjacent districts such as Tonkilili (and eight hour journey), 
which left open the possibly of cross-contamination in ambulances or other forms of 
transport.  
On September 18, 2014, the United Nations Security Council declared the Ebola 
outbreak in the West Africa "threat to international peace and security" and advised UN 
member states to provide more resources to fight the outbreak, which marked the first 
time the Security Council exercised its powers to intervene in a public health crisis. On 
September 19, 2014 the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) was 
formed to address the epidemic and was tasked with coordinating the United Nations vast 
resources to combat the epidemic under the leadership of Dr. David Nabaro (214).  
On October 1, the UNMEER roled out a 90-day plan to control and reverse the 
epidemic, in which benchmark goals were delineated. The plan set 60 and 90 day goals: 
by December 1, 2014 (a 60-day target) the objective was to build enough treatment 
centers to isolate at least 70% of Ebola cases and have enough burial teams to safely bury 
at least 70% of patients. By 90 days, on January 1, 2015, the goal was to have capacity in 
place for the isolation of 100% of cases and the safe burial of 100% of patients, which 
was expected to result in an 85% decline in transmission in afected areas (174). 
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The need for beds continued to far outweigh supply. New Ebola Treatment 
Centers were slowly being built: two were erected in Guinea, six in Liberia and nine in 
Siera Leone. MSF added a sixth 30-bed treatment center in Macenta that was run by the 
Red Cross and expanded capacity in Gueckendou by 15 beds (174). By the end of the 
month, 22% of the 4707 planned beds were built and 2110 more were earmarked for 
construction with a dedicated funding partner (175). 
There were 140 safe burial teams in operation (24 in Guinea, 56 in Liberia and 50 
in Siera Leone) but nearly 400 more were needed to meet the UNMEER goal by 
December 1 (175). 
Social mobilization campaigns increased in frequency and coverage during 
October.  Guinea distributed hygiene kits to 71,000 households (486,000 people) (174); 
UNICEF reached 85,415 households (575,374 people) through door-to-door campaigns 
and has distributed over five milion bars of soap and botles of chlorine for hand 
washing and household water treatment since the outbreak began (241). MSF distributed 
50,000 family protection and home disinfection kits in Monrovia (181). In Conakry, the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) mobilized a network of 2,500 young 
volunteers to distribute soap and chlorine and to teach community members how to 
thoroughly wash hands and to avoid contact with possible cases (242). UNDP also 
supplied hygiene kits containing 125 buckets, 420 bars of soap, and 50,000 information 
leaflets to the 30,000 members of the Siera Leone Commercial Motorbike Riders Union 
to help reduce transmission. Known as Okada riders, these drivers pick up as many as 
100 fares a day and are at high risk of Ebola infection due to the close contact they have 
with the people they transport (243). 
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Religious leaders delivered prevention messages in an estimated 700 sermons 
across the country in over 12,000 mosques. Imams gave sermons, some as long as 30 
minutes, about Ebola and how to protect oneself (177). A SMS campaign designed to 
coincide with the Festival of Tabaski delivered messages on hygiene practices. In Liberia, 
50 radio stations, with the support from UNICEF, broadcast Ebola prevention messages 
to approximately 1.5 milion listeners (175). Siera Leone reached 1.5 milion households 
in a house-to-house campaign (169).  
Ebola in Mali (215; 216; 217; 218) October 2014 also saw the first Ebola case in 
Mali, when a two-year old litle girl traveled from Beyla, Guinea while symptomatic, into 
Mali with her step-grandmother. A closer look at the sequence of events that led to the 
arival of the virus in Mali is a good ilustration, much like the first Nigerian Ebola case, 
of how one patient can expose hundreds of people to the virus across borders.  
It started in the beginning of October when the two-year old’s father, who was a 
Red Cross volunteer in a private medical clinic, became il and died. He was not an 
oficialy known Ebola patient, but regardless of the cause of his ilness, the people of 
Beyla believed that he was sufering from a bad-luck curse that was cast upon him 
folowing an argument with the vilage chief. Shunned from his peers, he retreated from 
Beyla to his native vilage of Sokodough, Guinea 143 km away, where he died on 
October 3, 2014. 
In the meantime, back in Beyla, the man’s mother fel il and died of unknown 
causes on October 8. The next day, two of his (the father of the two-year old) brothers 
became il, and after seeking treatment at a local hospital were transported to an MSF-run 
Ebola Treatment Center in Macenta. One of the brothers died en route and it is presumed 
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that the other died shortly after ariving at the ETC. Samples from both brothers taken 
post mortem came back positive for Ebola. A week later, the grandfather of the two-year 
old girl (and father of the three men who died) became il himself, tested positive for 
Ebola, and died on October 20 in Gueckedou. At this point, the two-year old’s father, two 
uncles, and grandfather were al dead. Her mother was stil in good health.  
The child’s maternal step-grandmother arived from Kayes, Mali to Beyes, 
Guinea to ofer sympathies and returned to Mali on October 19 with her two-year old 
granddaughter, her other five-year-old granddaughter and her grown son (the children’s 
uncle). Before their departure, the two-year-old was showing symptoms of Ebola: she had 
a high fever, cough, a bloody nose and bloody stools.  
The party traveled by bus from Beyes, Guinea to Bamako, Mali where they 
disembarked and spent time visiting relatives in a household with 25 people. They then 
took another bus from Bamko to Kayes, Mali (Kayes has a population of 128,000 people 
and is located 600 km from the Malian capital of Bamko near the border of Mali and 
Senegal) where two traditional healers saw the child, one of whom took her to a nurse. 
This nurse suspected Ebola and took the child to Fousseyni Daou Hospital in Bamko 
where she was admited on October 21. The preliminary diagnosis was malaria or typhoid 
(negative for the former and positive for the later) but she did not respond to treatment. 
Lab results on October 23 came back positive for Ebola, at which point she was treated in 
isolation. The two-year-old girl died on October 24.  
One hundred and eight contacts of the child were identified, 79 of whom were in 
the hospital, including 33 health care workers. These numbers do not include the contacts 
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of her paternal dead relatives in Guinea, al of whom were either confirmed or probable 
Ebola patients.  
The Malian and WHO response was swift, thanks in part to WHO and CDC staf 
already on the ground in the country to implement prophylactic Ebola preparedness 
measures. They immediately began tracing contacts, isolating and monitoring suspected 
contacts, and implemented education campaigns on transmission risk and the imperative 
to seek immediate medical help for suspected cases. Existing public health infrastructure 
in Mali that were previously established by the US National Institutes of Health 
Tuberculosis and HIV projects further aided the country in its ability to rapidly respond 
to the outbreak. At the time of this writing, no other contacts associated with the two-year 
old girl have been documented as faling il or dying from Ebola.  
 
Case Counts as of October 31, 2014 
 
  Guinea  Liberia  Sierra Leone  
 Cases Deaths %Δ 
cases 
Cases Deaths %Δ 
cases 
Cases Deaths %Δ 
cases 
Mar. (131) 122 80  8 2     
April (136) 218 141 73% 35      
May (140) 291 193 37% Not Available  50  6  
June (147) 413 303 41% 107 65  239 99 378% 
July (158) 472 346 14% 391 227 265% 574 252 140% 
Aug(164) 648 430 37% 1378 694 252% 1026 422 78.7% 
Sept (173) 1157 270 78.5% 3696 1639 168% 2304 884 125% 
Oct (179) 1667 1018 44% 6535 2413 76.8% 5338 1510 132% 
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Clinical Features and Epidemiologic Parameters of West African Outbreak (180) 
 
Nine months into the epidemic, The WHO Ebola Response Team conducted a wel-
powered analysis of the epidemiologic parameters that defined the outbreak, which has 
heretofore been impossible because past outbreaks have occured sporadicaly and in 
remote, resource limited setings. The data set included medical record information and 
clinical data from 4507 probable and confirmed Zaire Ebola cases that occured from 
December 30, 2013 – September 14, 2014 in Guinea, Siera Leone, Liberia, Nigeria and 
Senegal.  
In concordance with past Zaire Ebola outbreaks, the most common symptoms 
upon presentation to a medical facility were: fever (87.1%), fatigue (76.4%), loss of 
appetite (64.5%), vomiting (67.6%) and diarhea (65.6%) (Table Two). 
Demographicaly, the majority of the patients (60.8%) were 15 – 44 years old and equal 
in number with respect to gender. Patients who were 45 years or older had a higher risk 
of death (Odds Ratio 2.47, 95% Confidence Interval 1.79 – 3.46). Most of the symptoms 
common to Ebola infection were not statisticaly significant risk factors** for death, such 
as fever, fatigue, headache, vomiting and diarhea. However, symptoms that were 
statisticaly significant indicators of death such as chest pain, cough, hiccups, dificulty 
swalowing and breathing, confusion, coma or unconsciousness, and hemorhagic 
symptoms generaly occur late in the course of a typical Ebola infection. Data and 
anecdotal information from past Ebola outbreaks indicate that once a patient begins to 
exhibit these symptoms they wil most likely die. 
**For the purposes of this paper, I defined statisticaly significant as those parameters in which the 95% confidence interval did not 
cross the nul. Odds ratios were adjusted for country. 
  
   107 
           
 
     Source: htp:/www.nejm.org/doi/ful/10.1056/NEJMoa1411100#t=article 
  
Table Two: (180) Demographic characteristics and disease signs and symptoms of 4500 Zaire 
Ebola patients in West Africa who were treated from December 30, 2013 – September 14, 2014. 
Most of symptoms were not statisticaly significant risk factors for death, expect those that are 
normaly seen in the final stages of disease pathogenesis. While the risk of death was essentialy 
equal between genders, older patients did have a significantly higher risk of death. 
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The mean incubation period (the time between initial exposure to the virus and 
the onset of symptoms) was 11.4 days. This parameter can be used as a proxy for the 
amount of time contact tracers have to properly identify and quarantine patients in the 
community who could have possibly been infected with Ebola. The mean time from 
onset of symptoms to hospitalization was 5.0 +/- 4.7 days, which is a measure of the 
period that any given patient is infectious in the community. Once admited, patients who 
died did so after 4.2 days of hospitalization and those who survived were discharged 11.8 
days later, statistics that are reflective of other outbreaks. 
The Case Fatality Rates were 64.3% among hospitalized patients with a known 
clinical outcome and 70.8% among al patients with a known clinical outcome. However, 
this statistic is only as reliable as the data it comes from: in order for patients to be 
included in the analysis they had to survive long enough to get to a treatment center. 
They not only had to obtain transportation to the treatment centers (and by al accounts, 
ambulance service in West Africa during the height of the outbreak was unreliable at 
best), but also they had to actualy be admited to the center to be counted. There was a 
wel-documented shortage of beds during most of the outbreak, leaving many patients to 
either wait and die, literaly in treatment center doorways, or they returned home to die. 
It is likely that many patients, including those who were the most seriously il and simply 
couldn’t physicaly make it to a center, died quickly and before they could obtain proper 
care, meaning that the true case fatality rate could be higher than these rates calculated.  
A few parameters that were not accounted for in this analysis were the quality of 
health care, the type of treatment received or the ratio of patients to doctors at the time of 
admission. Various papers have ilustrated, and was discussed earlier in this paper, that 
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administering Oral Rehydration Therapy and maintaining electrolyte levels is imperative 
to ensuring positive patient outcomes. It is also reasonable to assume that those who 
sought care earlier in the outbreak may have beter care and more positive outcomes than 
those who received care later in the outbreak when facilities were overwhelmed with 
patients. Likewise, although the mean time from symptom onset to hospitalization was 
measured, it was not held constant in the odds ratio calculations. It would be informative 
to measure risk factors for death between patients who sought and received care 
immediately upon symptom onset as compared to those who waited a five days or longer. 
The basic reproduction number (Ro), a measure of the number of people who wil 
be infected by one sick person in a population solely made up of susceptible patients, was 
calculated as 1.71 in Guinea; 1.8 in Liberia; and 2.02 in Siera Leone. The net 
reproduction number (R(t) for the period of July 28 – September 7 measured at 1.81 for 
Guinea, 1.51 for Liberia and 1.38 for Siera Leone. The integrity of the reproductive 
number is dependent upon accurate and thorough reporting of cases. Considering that 
substantial undereporting of cases has been problematic in this epidemic; the true 
reproductive number may indeed be higher. 
 While the R(o) is a static measure and indicative of the infectiousness of a 
pathogen, R(t) is a dynamic variable that ilustrates the negative relationship between the 
length of an epidemic and the Basic Reproduction Number. In the long term, R(t) wil 
decrease as the number of survivors increases (assuming that survivors have immunity to 
re-infection) and the number of susceptible people decreases. When the value dips below 
one, the epidemic cannot be sustained and it wil eventualy burn out. However, in the 
short term, it is to be expected that R(t) wil actualy rise at the beginning of an epidemic 
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while there is heavy transmission and before infection control procedures can be 
implemented. As time passes and as community adherence to infection control practices 
are more closely observed, it is expected that R(t) wil decrease. Indeed, in West Africa 
there has been a variation of R(t) over time with clear spikes and valeys that coincide 
with an increase of reported Ebola cases (Figure 18). 
This is particularly noticeable in Liberia where a ban on traditional burial 
practices was implemented and repeated messages were delivered regarding transmission 
control and the imperative of seeking proper care in an Ebola Treatment Center. 
Conversely, in Guinea it has been widely acknowledged by the WHO and MSF that there 
has been, and continues to be, strong resistance to Ebola Response Teams; a systematic 
refusal to accept that Ebola is real; and the perpetual hiding of infectious patients. This 
resulted in a decrease of reported cases, which is shown in the R(t) graphs. This dip did 
not actualy represent a decrease in transmission. When the number of cases hidden away 
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Data from another set of 106 Ebola positive patients in Siera Leone who were 
treated from May 25 – June 18, 2014 showed similar results (139). Of these 106 patients, 
44 had a known outcome and an associated clinical chart. At presentation, 89% of these 
exhibited fever; 80% had headache; 43% were vomiting; and 61% had diarhea. 
Statisticaly significant factors for death were diarhea, weakness, dizziness, and age 
above 21 (see Table Three). In addition, of patients who had a known outcome (N=87), 











Figure Eighteen (10: The WHO Estimates of the reproduction number (Rt ) over 
4-week period, by country and by week of symptom onset. The top row is based 
on confirmed and probable cases, the botom row is based on confirmed, probable 
and suspected cases. The dip of R(t) below one in April coincides with the drop of 
reported cases, which indicated that the outbreak was waning and could not be 
sustained. It is now known cases and their contacts were hiding from 
epidemiological surveilance out of fear and that transmission was stil in fact 
occurring at a rather rapid rate. In early May, as these cases began to emerge, R(t) 
rose again. 
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show that those who had more than 10 milion copies of virus per milliliter of serum had 
a statisticaly significant higher risk of death than those who presented with less than 
100,00 copies of virus (Table Four).  While the viral load measurements were taken at 
time of presentation to the Kenema Government Hospital, how long each patient had 
been infectious was not factored into the calculations. For example, it is not clear if 
patients who had higher viral loads upon arival actualy waited longer to seek care (the 
mean time to seek care after onset of symptoms was 5.7 +/- 0.5 days in this study), which 
has been shown to be a risk factor for death. It is impossible to disentangle whether it was 
waiting to seek care or if it was viral load upon presentation that is the true risk factor for 
death. Furthermore, it has been argued by some scientists that viral load is not a predictor 
of death since at the beginning of an Ebola infection, viral load is generaly the same 
between fatal and non-fatal cases. If this is true, then the ability for one person to survive 
over another may come down to genetic factors, underlying health conditions or the 
qualitative and quantitative measures of care. Therefore, perhaps viral load at 
presentation could be used as a proxy measurement for the risk of death in waiting to 
seek care.  
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 Fatal Not Fatal Total Odds Ratio PValue 
Diarhea 17 1 18 6.27 P<.05 
No Diarhea 19 7 26 1.00  
Total  36 8 44   
 
 Fatal Not Fatal Total Odds Ratio PValue 
Weak 22 1 23 11 P <.01 
Not Weak 14 7 21 1.00  
Total  36 8 44   
 
 Fatal Not Fatal Total Odds Ratio PValue 
Dizzy 20 1 21 9.18 P<.01 
Not Dizzy 16 7 23 1.00  
Total  36 8 44   
 
  
Table Three: (146) Statisticaly significant risk factors of death among 44 patients who had 
complete medical charts and observed outcomes. Al patients presented to the Kenema 
Government Hospital in Siera Leone between the days of May 25 – June 18, 2014. 
Measurements and symptoms were recorded upon presentation. Those who presented with 
diarrhea had 6.27 times greater odds of death than those who did not exhibit such 
symptoms. Patients who reported feeling weak had 11 times greater risk of death than those 
who did not report feeling weak. Those who complained of dizziness had a nine times 
greater odds of death than those who were not dizzy upon arrival. While these results are 
interesting, they are hampered by a smal N and are not particularly powerful. 
 
To calculate the odds ratio in Table Three and Table Four I used the numbers of fatal and 
not fatal patients according to risk factor and/or clinical symptoms that were provided in the 
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 Fatal Not Fatal Total Odds Ratio PValue 
Age Under 21 13 10 23 1.00  
Age 21 – 45 35 12 47 2.2  
Age Over 45 15 1 16 11.5 P = .03 
 63 23 86   
 
 Fatal Not Fatal Total Odds Ratio PValue 
<10̂5 5 10 15 1.00  
10̂5 – 10̂7 23 7 30 6.56  
>10̂7 17 1 18 34 P <.001 





Table Four: Age was shown to be a statisticaly significant risk factor for death with 
those who were over the age of 45 showing a 11.5 times greater risk of death. Likewise, 
those patients who had viral loads of greater than 10 milion copies per mililiter of 
serum had 34 times greater odds of death than those who had loads of less than 100,000 
copies at presentation.  
 
A limited number of patients also had viral loads measured longitudinaly throughout 
their hospitalization and the results indicated that it was the inability to clear the virus, 
regardless of viral load upon presentation that was a risk factor for death. This inability 
could be related to several different factors discussed in the pathogenesis and 
immunology section of this paper. 
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Phylogenetics of West African Outbreak (183; 184) As previously discussed, cases of 
Zaire Ebolavirus had not been recorded in West Africa before 2014 and it is unclear as to 
how or why the virus appeared 3000 km (approximately 2000 miles) away from its 
presumed natural home in Central Africa. Phylogenetic analysis of the Ebola strain found 
in West Africa provided some evolutionary evidence as to the history of the virus and 
how closely related it was to Ebola strains of outbreaks past. Genomic sequencing of 
viral isolates from 78 confirmed Ebola patients in Siera Leone revealed that the curent 
epidemic arose from a variant of the Zaire Ebolavirus that diverged from Central African 
strains within the past decade (around 2004).  
The phylogenetic tree on the left hand side of Figure 19 represents a tree that was 
constructed using Ebola strains from past outbreaks as wel as those taken from the 78 
Siera Leone patients as wel as three patients from Guinea. The 2014 strains form their 
own clade but share a common ancestor with the strains isolated from the 2007 outbreak 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The separation of the Siera Leone and the Guinea 
strains into a diferent clade supports the theory that the 2014 outbreak did not spread 
from a curently infected person in Central Africa, but rather that the genesis of this 
outbreak was most likely the result of an independent zoonotic event. While it has been 
argued that an infected person could have become infected in Central Africa and then 
traveled to West Africa, this seems unlikely (10). If typical modes of transportation were 
utilized, it could take up to a week to travel between these two parts of the continent. 
Considering the time period from initial exposure to Ebola to death, it is nearly 
impossible for an infected person to travel from Central Africa to Guinea within the 
confines of the disease pathogenesis, be infectious upon arival, and able to transmit the 
   116 
virus. Furthermore, genetic similarities across the 2014 samples, which are ilustrated in 
the horizontal distance between each of the variants, imply that only one spilover event 
sparked the outbreak and that subsequent spread of the disease has been sustained 
through human-to-human transmission.  
The tree on the right hand side of Figure 19 is a tre that was constructed solely 
using the strains isolated from patients in Siera Leone and Guinea. The tree shows that 
the outbreak started in Guinea in March and went through a few mutations as 
transmission increased. The tree also appears to show that although the strains found in 
Siera Leone are geneticaly descended from the Guinea strain, there are two separate 
clades, perhaps three, which suggests that there were two strains circulating in Siera 
Leone. This supports a theory that there that there were two distinct viruses introduced 
into Siera Leone from Guinea within a couple of months of each other.  
  









Figure Nineteen (183): Phylogenetic tree of 78 confirmed Ebola patients in Sierra 
Leone who were diagnosed from late May to mid-June and three laboratory confirmed 
Guinean samples. The tree to the right shows that the Sierra Leone and Guinea strains 
are on separate branches but within the same clade. Outbreak strains that are the most 
phylogeneticaly similar to the 2014 strains are those that were found in the 2007 
outbreak in Luebo, Democratic Republic of Congo, which is housed in its own clade. 
The nearest common ancestor of the two clades is dated to about 2004, when there was a 
divergence in the Zaire Ebolavirus strains.  
 
The tree to the left shows a Beast generated tree of only the 2014 strains. The three 
Guinea strains are very closely related and the spread of the disease into Siera Leone is 
clearly marked. Within the Siera Leone variants, there are two separate clades, which 
indicates that there were two geneticaly distinct viruses introduced into the country 
from Guinea. Al subsequent diversity in the Siera Leone variants are descended from 
these two viruses. 













Figure Twenty (184): A phylogenetic tree containing the three Guinea strains along 
with strains from past outbreaks as wel as strains taken from apes that perished in the 
Lossi Sanctuary in 2002. In concordance with the tree constructed in Figure 20, the 
2014 strains form their own clade and share a nearest common ancestor with the 
strains found in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2007. Posterior probabilities 
indicate that there is 92% certainty that the strains diverged from one another around 
2004.  
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Zoonotic Reservoir of West African Outbreak The zoonotic reservoir for the Ebolavirus 
has never been definitively identified and it was thought that perhaps non-human 
primates that tested positive for Ebola RNA might be the reservoir host. Several human 
Ebola outbreaks have been associated with the handling and consumption of infected 
mammal carcasses (most frequently chimpanzees) and there have been documented 
epidemics in non-human primate communities that occured concurently with human 
outbreaks. However, al evidence that has been colected and observed with respect to 
Ebola pathogenesis in non-human primates suggests that they, like humans, develop 
symptomatic and fatal infection. This would point to their role as an intermediary or 
dead-end host, rather than the reservoir (187; 189). 
Bats, on the other hand, have stronger evidence to support the hypothesis that they 
may be the reservoir host. In 1996, lab experiments proved that bats infected with Zaire 
Ebolavirus were able to replicate virus, mount an adaptive immune response and survive 
without showing signs of overt infection (187). In 2002, during a post-outbreak 
investigation, Ebolavirus RNA was detected in three diferent fruit bats that lived in the 
Gabonese forest (189). In 2005, viral RNA sequences were found in the liver and the 
spleen of three diferent kinds of fruit bats, none of which exhibited symptoms: 
Hypisignathus Monstrosus, Epomops Franqueti , and Myonycetris Torquata. While IgG 
antibodies to Zaire Ebolabvirus were found in these species of bats as wel, neither RNA 
nor IgG antibodies were found at the same time. Although nucleotide sequences were 
found in the bat specimens, scientists were not able to isolate the virus itself (186; 187). 
The index case in the 2007 outbreak in Luebo, Democratic Republic of Congo was 
reported to have contact with freshly kiled bats in a market just prior to faling il with a 
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mild case of Ebola (54). Al of these findings give weight to the hypothesis that bats are 
the natural reservoir host of the Ebolavirus, however, none proves it beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The strongest evidence that has implicated bats as the reservoir host was in 2007 
when Marburgvirus was isolated from the fruit bat Rousetus Aegypticus (188, 190). 
The exact mechanisms of bat immunology is not entirely understood, but it is 
believed that bats can maintain an asymptomatic state while sustaining viral replication 
and mounting an adaptive immune response (with a coresponding helper TCel 
activation) that clears the infection. While some believe that bats only shed virus while 
under active viral replication, others have hypothesized that bats maintain a chronic, 
active viral state and that shedding occur in spatial pulses during times of immunologic 
stress related to food scarcity or pregnancy (185). 
With respect to the spilover event that started the 2014 outbreak (123), al that 
was known was that the index patient was a two-year-old boy in Meliandou. No hard data 
had been colected regarding any exposure he may have had to bats or other intermediate 
hosts. There was not any evidence that suggested a decline in non-human primate or 
mammal populations in the forests surounding Meliandou, that wasn’t explained by 
hunting or migration, prior to or concurently with human transmission of the virus in 
December.  
Operating under the assumption that the two-year old boy from Guekendou was 
the index case and that he was exposed to the virus from either the natural reservoir or 
intermediate host, a team of scientists spent four weeks in April 2014 in Meliandou 
looking for data that could shed some light as to the nature of the primary spilover event. 
The goal for the expedition was to locate the zoonotic reservoir, to ascertain if there had 
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been widespread wildlife decline prior to the outbreak, and to study human behaviors and 
practices associated with hunting bats and other wildlife. 
The team did not find that there had been a decline in local wildlife populations 
either concurently with or prior to the outbreak in Meliandou, leading researchers to 
believe that handling of wild game or bushmeat was not the spilover culprit. In this area 
of Guinea, most large game that is consumed is not hunted localy, rather it is brought in 
from areas in the northwestern part of the country. While this does leave open the 
possibility that the imported meat was infected, this is not likely. Even had wild life been 
infected with Ebola, the index case would have most likely been one of the hunters or a 
person who bought and prepared the meat for consumption, not a two-year-old child.  
Fruit Bats, on the other hand, are hunted and consumed localy. Local bat hunting 
is primarily the responsibility of the patriarch of the family, who hunts with a gun, nets or 
his bare hands. Bats are generaly hunted in forest patches or caves surounding 
Meliandou and the catch is either sold at market or burned in a fire to be used for meat in 
sauces. Children also hunt and capture bats with their friends as a form of amusement, 
but do so in a diferent manner than adult hunters. They find bats in holow trees or under 
thatched rooftops and use a stick or their hands to directly catch them or knock them to 
the ground. The species of bats that are hunted for food are diferent than those bats that 
are hunted for amusement by children; hunters target fruit bats while children aim at 
insectivorous bats. 
The investigating team was able to capture and sacrifice 13 species of bats 
representing six diferent bat families (they captured 88 bats in Meliandou, 20 in 
Kagbadou, four in Kelema and 57 in Zaima) in the area including and surounding 
   122 
Meliandou, three of which (Eidolon Helvum, Hypsignathus Monstrosus and Mops 
Condylurus) were found serologicaly or RT-PCR positive for Ebolavirus, although no 
viral RNA was detected and tests for Ebolavirus IgG antibodies were inconclusive. This 
does not prove that the bats are the reservoir and it certainly does not prove that bats in 
the area at the time of the spilover event were infectious or shedding virus. Al it means 
is that at the time of the research, bats were found to have either Ebola antibodies or 
fragments of virus in their bodies. 
Through interviews with local vilagers and observations of the topography of the 
land surounding the vilage, researchers did discover a holow tree located 50 meters 
from the home of the index patient. This tree was known to be the residence of a colony 
of bats as wel as a playground for children, including the index patient. Researchers were 
not able to examine the tree or capture any of the bats that resided in it. On March 24, 
2014 as the epidemic grew and authorities issued warnings about the dangers of 
consuming bushmeat, the tree was burned down. There are conflicting stories as to the 
rationale for burning the tree. Some vilagers reported that the tree was burned because of 
the bushmeat ban, others say that the tree was burned during a botched atempt to extract 
honey and yet other stories indicate that the tree was burned accidentaly by children who 
were playing with fire. 
Regardless of how or why the tree was burned, there are consistent reports that a 
‘rain of bats’ emerged from the tree as flames consumed it and a large number of these 
bats perished in the fire. Those bats were colected by residents of Gueckendou with the 
intent of consumption, but they were discarded the next day after the oficial ban on 
bushmeat was announced. RNA sequencing analysis from ash samples and soil around 
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the base of the tree indicated that Mops Condylurns bats, also known as the insectivorous 
Angolan Free Tailed Bat, inhabited the tree.  
The results of this investigation into the potential zoonotic reservoirs in 
Gueckendou did not uncover any evidence that handling of diseased intermediate hosts 
was the cause of the outbreak. Likewise there was no evidence that implicated adult 
hunting and consumption of bats as the zoonotic event. No hunters resided in the 
household of the index patient and had the spilover been tied to consumption, the person 
who handled the bats during hunting and/or preparation would have been the index 
patient, which was not the case in this outbreak.  
The only epidemiologic evidence uncovered in Gueckedou with respect to 
possible zoonotic reservoirs and the two-year-old child was the holowed out tree and the 
bats that resided in it, but nothing discovered in the investigation could implicate bats in 
that tree as the zoonotic source. Given anecdotal evidence about bat handling behaviors 
in the vilage and the elimination of other sources of spilover normaly atributed to 
Ebolavirus outbreaks, it is possible that the zoonotic event could be related to the Mops 
Condylurns bats residing in a holow tree where the index patient played, but it is far 
from conclusive. It seems highly unlikely that a two-year-old child would be old enough 
or dexterous enough to engage in the hunting of bats, however it is possible that he could 
have been exposed to the virus while playing in the tree or he might have played with an 
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Discussion 
On March 25, 2015, nearly one year after Ebola was identified in West Africa, there have 
been 24, 907 reported cases of Ebola and 10,326 deaths (98). For a brief moment in the 
spring of 2014, as recorded case counts declined, the WHO and the Ministries of Health 
believed that the outbreak would naturaly burn out, as al other outbreaks in the past had 
done (137). That prediction did not come to pass. Transmission continued unabated both 
within Africa and across international borders ever since, making this Ebola outbreak the 
largest ever recorded. There are several reasons as to why this outbreak has become the 
largest in history and has failed to respond to historicaly efective transmission control 
eforts.  
 
1. Coordination and Leadership Issues The first and foremost reason is that a 
centralized, robust and international response was not implemented immediately. The 
WHO failed to acknowledge the seriousness of the virus and its potential to spiral out of 
control during the first few critical months of the epidemic. Lost opportunities were 
fueled by structural issues within the WHO itself and weaknesses in the organization.  
 In past Ebola outbreaks, once Ebola was identified, local WHO ofices and 
Ministries of Health communicated openly with WHO and immediately requested the 
deployment of international teams of experts to control viral transmission. In the Uganda 
Sudan Ebolavirus outbreak in 2000, Ebola was identified as the causative agent on 
October 15, 2000, and the very next week the Ministry of Health requested that the WHO 
coordinate the international response (101). In the Gabon Zaire Ebolavirus outbreaks 
from 1994 to 1996, the Gabonese health authorities requested the intervention of Centre 
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International de Recherches Médicales de Francevile (CIRMF) two weeks after a cluster 
of deaths from an unknown cause were reported. The CIRMF team identified Ebola in 
that outbreak and was in the area to assist in implementing control measures for the next 
two outbreaks that occured over the next two years, both of which were contained 
relatively quickly resulting in comparably few deaths (98; 99). In Yambio, Sudan a 
cluster of deaths from an unknown cause was reported on May 6, 2004; the WHO and the 
Kenya Medical Research Institute conducted an initial investigation on May 9, 2004; 
Ebola was detected from patient samples on May 16, 2004; and on May 19, 2004 a first-
response team made up of members from the WHO’s South Sudan Early Warning and 
Response Network and the WHO headquarters in Geneva was dispatched to the field to 
support local health authorities (192). During the Mekambo outbreak in 2001, it took 
only eight days after Ebola was verified from patient samples for a response team 
comprised of members from the Gabonese Ministry of Health, the WHO headquarters in 
Geneva and partners from The Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) 
to be dispatched to the field (100; 193). In Luebo, Congo in 2007, approximately one 
month after Ebola was detected, the Democratic Republic of Congo Ministry of Health, 
MSF, and the WHO headquarters in Geneva formed an international response team that 
investigated and controled the outbreak (54). 
The only outbreak that did not have a timely response from the WHO was in 
Kikwit, Congo in 1995 (96). The outbreak investigation began in May, three months after 
cases started to present at local hospitals and five months after the first case was detected 
in January 1995. The initial investigation was to assess if the putative cause of death was 
dysentery, which added another six weeks delay in determining that patients were in fact 
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dying of Ebola. However, once Ebola was confirmed, an international team was formed 
in 48 hours and was sent to the field to interupt viral transmission and to reestablish 
confidence in the health services. The team included experts from the WHO, the CDC, 
Institute of Tropical Medicine, MSF, South African Medical Institute, the International 
Red Cross, and Institut Pasteur. 
In the West Africa outbreak, the WHO West African Regional Ofice was tasked 
with guiding control eforts on the ground, deploying personnel to afected regions, and 
supporting the eforts of Ministries of Health (124). However, rather than appointing Dr. 
Piere Formety, the WHO’s top Ebola authority as the coordinator of the response team, 
the West African ofice chose an oficial from the Guinea WHO Ofice who had never 
before been involved in an Ebola outbreak (3). 
Localy, the Guinean, Liberian and (eventualy) Siera Leone Ministries of Health 
activated national and district emergency management commitees to search for and 
manage cases; to trace contacts; and to educate communities on transmission (124; 127). 
They distributed Personal Protective Equipment, medical supplies, and trained health care 
workers on the Ebola itself and infection control (125). Their main partner on the ground 
was MSF (124, 168) who established an Ebola Treatment Center and was actively 
isolating and treating patients, while the WHO reported that they were “closely 
monitoring the need for logistics in afected areas and building capacity on the ground to 
stop transmission” (137). 
Local eforts were inadequate to control the spread of the disease. On May 27, 
2014, two months after Ebola specific containment eforts began, there were 281 reported 
cases and 176 deaths and the virus had spread to the Guinean capital of Conakry, the 
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Liberian capital of Monrovia and into Siera Leone (138; 126; 140; 141; 142). To put it in 
perspective, number of cases and deaths at this time were edging upon those that were 
seen in some of the largest outbreaks recorded. Of the outbreaks mentioned in this paper 
that received international support, the final case counts were: 315 cases and 250 deaths 
in Kikwit, 425 cases and 224 deaths in Uganda, 149 cases and 97 deaths in Gabon during 
1994-1996, 17 cases and seven deaths in Yambio, 65 cases and 53 deaths in Mekambo, 
and 32 cases and 15 deaths in Luebo (18; 122). 
Throughout the balance of May and into June, the WHO reported that they were 
continuing to develop response plans and held regular meetings at the national levels to 
review the situation and to propose control measures. In early July, there was a sub-
regional Ministerial meeting in Accra, Ghana to address solutions for ending the 
outbreak. On July 18, 2014, when there were 1048 cases and 632 deaths (151), the WHO 
was stil reviewing the outbreak responses, developing plans and identifying response. 
By the end of July, the WHO West African Ofice, along with the governments of 
Guinea, Siera Leone, and Liberia, finaly understood that their ability to stem 
transmission had failed and oficialy asked the WHO in Geneva to coordinate the 
response and to take over control eforts. Approximately a week later, the WHO declared 
the outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (9; 159), but it wasn’t 
until August 28, 2014 that the WHO released the Ebola Response Roadmap (164), which 
laid out an oficial plan to stop the virus from spreading. By this time, local health 
systems were overwhelmed and the virus had spread to the point where it was beyond 
being contained with available resources. The window of opportunity to control the 
outbreak in an expedient manner and minimize morbidity and mortality had closed. 
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2. Mobility and Urban Paradigms An important concern unique to this outbreak 
is the mobility of the people in West Africa, particularly in the area where the outbreak 
began, and the consequent spread of the virus to urban centers (10). Gueckedou is located 
where the borders of Guinea, Siera Leone and Liberia converge and major road networks 
there alow people to travel across the porous borders to patronize markets, visit family 
and to participate in shared socio-cultural practices (102; 148; 208). As mentioned earlier 
in this paper, it is believed that the initial Liberian case was a woman who contracted the 
virus in Guinea when she patronized a market there (126; 207). The primary cluster of 
cases in Siera Leone was traced back to border movement after a group atended the 
funeral of a traditional healer in Guinea, became infected themselves and then returned to 
Siera Leone (138). The first cases in the Monrovia, Liberia and Conakry, Guinea 
traveled from rural areas via public transportation, creating multiple opportunities for 
high-risk exposure during the journey (207; 3). 
The geographical range of the 2014 outbreak was peculiar to this epidemic. Most 
outbreaks in the past were confined to remote setings of limited population that by 
definition alowed for a certain degree of containment (196). This gave public oficials a 
controled environment to engage in standard response protocols such as contact tracing, 
patient isolation, and quarantine. In West Africa, the virus spread almost immediately 
into Liberia and Siera Leone, making the outbreak area span thousands of square miles. 
Once infected individuals eventualy landed in capital cities, they were impossible to 
trace and the outbreak became impossible to control (195). 
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3. Community Factors 
After Ebola was identified, governments began to disseminate informational 
messages about the virus itself and how to control transmission. However, there was an 
inherent distrust in the government and public health messages with respect to Ebola. 
This skepticism of the government to act in the best interest of its people meant that 
citizens assumed that they were being lied to and that Ebola wasn’t real (244). 
Consequently, Ebola treatment teams were stonewaled when they tried to 
administer care in rural communities. The Red Cross estimated that their teams in the 
field have been atacked, on average, 10 times a month (197). MSF reported that one of 
their facilities in Guinea was atacked when locals heard a rumor that the organization 
had brought Ebola with them (199). Vehicles were vandalized and equipment was seized 
and publicaly burned. In Macenta, riots erupted because it was believed that an infection 
control team that was spraying chlorine was actualy spraying the disease. The riot grew 
to almost 3000 armed people and caused the team to literaly run for their lives (4). 
Vilagers close to the city of N’zerekore used machetes and clubs to kil a team made up 
of local oficials, health-care workers, and journalists who were traveling from vilage to 
vilage trying to raise awareness about the disease (198). The problem stil continues: it 
was reported on February 15, 2015 that crowds destroyed an Ebola facility and atacked 
health care workers in Faranah, Guinea after locals discovered that the Red Cross was 
planning to disinfect a school (219). 
This type of fear in the face of such a deadly disease is not a novelty or particular 
to West Africa. In the very first Ebola outbreak in Zaire in 1976, vilagers in Yambuku 
were incredibly terified and agitated. The team that responded to the outbreak reported 
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that they were able assuage those fears by explaining to vilagers what was known about 
the disease and how they intended to stop it. By al accounts, the vilagers were 
eventualy responsive, particularly when house-to-house visits included local clinicians 
(52; 94). 
The historical political paradigm that exists in West Africa is diferent than in 
1976 Zaire, but nonetheless, there was an acceptance of help and wilingness to do what 
was necessary to control the outbreak 38 years ago that was missing in 2014. It is 
dificult to know if the approach of the Ebola response teams in West Africa was 
diferent compared to Zaire. Regardless, the messages delivered in 2014 were ignored 
and fought against and this helped to spread the disease. It seems that the problem was 
noticeably more chalenging in Guinea, but the lack of acceptance, and the hesitancy to 
seek proper care and to abstain from high-risk practices was found in al three West 
African countries (148; 174). 
There was some headway made by the governments at the local level to establish 
trust and foster cooperation. In Guinea, representatives from the Ministry of Health and 
senior government oficials worked with 23 vilage leaders who agreed to embrace the 
parameters of the Ebola outbreak response and to work within their communities to 
encourage compliance (200). In Siera Leone, the 149 Paramount Chiefs (grass roots 
leaders bound to their communities by tradition and familial ties) commited to visiting 
households in their chiefdoms to check on health statuses and to educate people on the 
symptoms of Ebola and how to protect oneself. The Bumpeh Chiefdom in particular was 
very aggressive, seting up 200 hand washing stations, visiting every household every day 
and seting up 50 checkpoints to monitor movement both in and out of the chiefdom. 
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Also in Siera Leone, the head of traditional healers in one district agreed to stop treating 
patients suspected of having Ebola (201). 
There was also hesitancy on the part of patients to seek proper care, which fueled 
community transmission of the disease, because there was misunderstanding and fear of 
what happened inside the treatment centers. It was whispered in vilages that Ebola 
patients disappeared after they entered a treatment unit, never to be seen again and that 
their bodies would be “thrown away.” There were rumors that patients did not actualy 
receive care at al and that they were not fed. It was believed that entering a treatment 
center was tantamount to death. Dying from Ebola is a profoundly lonely and isolating 
experience and it was thought beter by many to remain at home and die amongst loved 
ones rather than in a frightening center surounded by doctors in ‘white space suits’ 
(245). 
While these rumors had no basis of truth to them, there were others that did. 
Many people did not want to seek treatment because they did not want to be known as the 
house or the family that had Ebola. The stigmatization of Ebola patients and their 
families in local communities and neighborhoods is very real. There is unkind gossip and 
social isolation. They are forbidden from using local wels, seling food at community 
markets, or atending religious services. 
As a result, relatives hid symptomatic family members and tried to escape the 
surveilance system, causing more transmission and death. Ebola “refugees” were known 
to flee infected towns to hide with family and friends in rural communities (4; 194). The 
numbers bear this out. Since late July 2014, the International Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies has been responsible for majority of the colection and the 
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cremation of al dead bodies from Ebola Treatment Centers in most of Liberia. For the 
period July 28–October 26 they reported that a total of 2,234 bodies were colected, the 
majority of which (1,179; 53%) were taken from homes or other community setings, and 
only 744 (33%) from Ebola Treatment Centers, 194 (9%) from other health facilities, and 
117 (5%) from unknown locations (202). 
The fact that most corpses were picked up in communities and not Ebola 
Treatment Centers indicate that there was indeed a problem of patients hiding in the 
home and that the epidemic was and is most likely much worse that what is reported by 
the WHO in their Situation Reports. The WHO acknowledges undereporting and 
confirms that there is and was deterioration in the ability of overwhelmed responders to 
record accurate data. Liberia in particular has had a dificult time reconciling data 
management, and it is believed that the number of actual cases in the West Africa region 
were twice as much (a Corection Factor of two) than what was being reported (203). 
 
4. Health Care Infrastructure 
Ebola Treatment Center Supply and Demand As cases increased and Ebola spread, the 
weak health care infrastructure buckled under the weight of trying to manage and 
properly isolate Ebola patients. As the number of Ebola admissions in hospitals increased 
and more and more health care workers became il and died, those who remained healthy 
were afraid to provide care and simply did not come to work. Some hospitals simply 
colapsed under the combination of the strain of too many patients and not enough staf to 
care for them. Many hospitals and clinics closed including JFK, the largest hospital in 
Liberia, which shut down in July for two months after several of its prominent doctors 
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died of Ebola. Many of those that remained open refused to treat patients with Ebola-like 
symptoms.  
In order to properly treat and isolate the rising number of Ebola patients, MSF, 
international organizations and foreign governments scrambled to build Ebola Treatment 
Centers, but there was stil a dearth of beds. As of January 14, 2015 (246), only 38% of 
the required beds (250 out of 655) were available in Guinea, 26% of the required beds 
(510 out of 1989) were available in Liberia and 68% of the required beds (1207 out of 
1783) were available in Siera Leone. Not only was there a shortage of beds, but also 
there was a shortage of qualified medical staf to care for patients, so even as centers 
were built they were understafed, which meant that patients were not receiving optimal 
care. The supply-demand disequilibrium meant that sick patients remained waiting, sick 
and infectious, outside of the center doors, where they often died or they returned home 
where they spread the disease to family members or anyone with whom they had close 
contact. 
 
Post Civil War The West African region had only recently emerged from years of conflict 
and civil war, which destroyed or disabled many sectors of the economy, including the 
heath care infrastructure. The Civil War in Siera Leone lasted from 1991 – 2002 and left 
the country with 70,000 dead, 2.6 milion people displaced and nearly every hospital 
established by the government destroyed. During the war, many doctor and nurses fled 
the country, leaving the citizens to literaly fend for themselves (204). In Liberia, where 
the civil war lasted from 1989 – 2003 (with a couple of intervening years of peace) the 
situation was much the same. The war left a near destruction of 242 out of the 293 health 
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care facilities. Most of the doctors and nurses left, leaving the country with 30 doctors for 
three milion people (205). Although Guinea did not find itself in its own civil war, the 
country was puled into the Liberia conflict when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
attacked Guinea on at least two occasions in 2000 and 2001, which left large-scale 
damage, kiled thousands of people, and displaced over 250,000 Guineans (240).  
The number of physicians per 1000 people is an indication of the availability of 
health care in the event one becomes il. In Siera Leone and to a lesser extent Liberia, 
the number of doctors in the country dwindled during the civil wars. As the epidemic 
expanded and deaths mounted, health care workers were a part of that statistic. By 
February 11, 2015, there were 830 health care workers infected and 488 of them died. 
 
Physicians per 1000 people 
 
 1990 1996 1997 2000 2004 2005 2008 2010 
Guinea .134   0.094 0.11 0.1  0.1 
Liberia   0.023  0.03  0.014 0.014 
Siera Leone   0.073   0.03  0.016 0.022 
Source: htp:/data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.MED.PHYS.ZS 
 
  In contrast to the doctor : population ratio in West Africa, the United States there 
is an average of 2.5 doctors per 1000 people; the United Kingdom has 9.4 doctors per 
1000 people; in Switzerland there are 11.3 doctors per 1000 people; and Norway has 9 
doctors per 1000 people. 
 
Infrastructure Spending Expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP, a measure of both 
public and private health expenditures and indicative of the strength of the health care 
infrastructure, also sufered because of the Civil Wars. The percentage spent in Siera 
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Leone dipped to 16% during the conflict, and only rose two percentage points after the 
war; in Liberia, only 6% was spent during the height of the war, but has risen to almost 
20% in 2011. While the United States consistently spends approximately 18% of GDP on 
health care; the United Kingdom 9.4%; Switzerland 11.3%; and Norway 9%, the GDP 
among these countries are very diferent from those in West Africa. Even though the 
percentage spent is around the same, actual monies alocated are much less in West 
Africa. Additionaly, money spent to maintain a functional system, such as that in the 
United States, is very diferent that monies distributed to repair broken or non-existent 
systems. The dichotomy is particularly noticeable in Siera Leone and Liberia where the 
economies dipped precipitously after the civil war ended. Interestingly, the GDP of 
Guinea did not sufer from a loss of national income and has had marginal growth. 
 
Expenditure on health care as a percentage of GDP 
 2000 2005 2010 2011 
Liberia 5.9 8 16.4 19.5 
Guinea 5.7 5.4 6.2 6 
Sierra Leone 17.5 16.1 20.8 18.8 
Source: htp:/data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS 
 
GDP in Current USD 
 1990     2000 2005 2010 2013 
Switzerland 2.57E+11 2.71E+11 4.07E+11 5.81E+11 6.85E+11 
UK 1.06E+12 1.54E+12 2.41E+12 2.40E+12 2.65E+12 
Guinea 2666616177 2995360969 2937072009 4735956476 6144131903 
Liberia 384400000 529064646 542000000 1292696476 1950960138 
S.Leone 649644826 635874002 1627853086 2578159496 4136280752 
US 5.97E+12 1.02E+13 1.30E+13 1.49E+13 1.67E+13 
Source: htp:/data.worldbank.org/ 
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Health Indicators Longitudinal measures of health care indicators, which could be 
construed as an efect of the functionality of a health care system as wel as markers of 
overal public health, reveal that during the war years infant and maternal mortality 
declined, but remain some of the highest in the world, even a decade after the war ended. 
Incidence of tuberculosis was down in Guinea but has increased in both Liberia and 
Siera Leone during and after the Civil Wars. While immunization rates have risen 
somewhat over the 23 year span represented here, the rates are stil short of what is 
necessary for what is required for herd immunity.  It should be noted that poor countries 
with a weak infrastructure, or those that are in the middle of a war, might not have the 
most reliable surveilance and data colection systems. It is entirely possible that the 
numbers reported to the World Bank by Guinea, Liberia, and Siera Leone are not 
representative of what was happening in these countries with respect to public health. 
 
Percentage Children Under Age Five Immunized Against DPT 
 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013 
Guinea 17 54 46 59 64 63 
Liberia   46 60 70 89 




Percentage Children Under Age Five Immunized Against Measles  
 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013 
Guinea 35 61 42 51 58 62 
Liberia   63 62 65 74 
S. Leone    37 71 81 83 
Source: htp:/data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.IMM.MEAS/countries 
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Incident Tuberculosis per 100,000 people 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013 
Guinea 249 250 228 210 186 177 
Liberia 199 220 240 267 293 308 
S. Leone  252 282 305 316 317 313 
Source: htp:/data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.TBS.INCD/countries 
 
Maternal Mortality (Deaths per 100,000 women) 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013 
Guinea 1100 1000 950 800 690 650 
Liberia 1200 1600 1100 880 680 640 
S. Leone  2300 2400 2200 1600 1200 1100 
Source: htp:/data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT 
 
Infant Mortality (Deaths per 1000 live births) 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013 
Guinea 238 206 170 137 112 101 
Liberia 248 229 175 118 82 71 
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The Human Development Index (htp:/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_Development_Index) is a measure of 
the prosperity of a nation that includes physical, educational, and economic health 
indicators. The tool was developed by Indian economist Amartya Sen and Pakistani 
economist Mahbub ul Haq in 1990 and has since been used by the United Nations as the 
country level measure of social and economic development. It is based on four criteria: 
life expectancy at birth, mean years of schooling, expected years of schooling and gross 
national income per capita. The calculation ranges from 0, indicating that a country has 
negligible human development to 1, indicating that a country has very high human 
development. 
 Below are the listed measures for Siera Leone, Guinea and Liberia. The 2013 
ranks are the latest oficial measurements available and countries are listed out of 187, 
which means that the West African countries have the lowest human development in the 
world, even before the Ebola outbreak.  
 
Human Development Index 
 
 1990 2000 2005 2010 2012 2013 2013 Rank HDI ∆ from 
2012 
Liberia   0.339 0.335 0.393 0.407 0.412 175 3 
Guinea   0.366 0.38 0.391 0.392 179 -2 




The Education Index A more direct and specific portrait of the educational status of a 
nation is measured by the Education Index, which is also published by the United Nations 
Development Program. It is calculated using two variables: mean years of schooling 
(years that a 25-year-old person or older has spent in schools) and expected years of 
schooling (years that a 5-year-old child wil spend with his education in his whole life). 
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A value of 1 is the highest possible theoretical score, indicating that a country has 
achieved perfect educational atainment. The scores in West Africa, listed below, have 
been consistently low over the past 25 years, with marginal improvements being made. 
By way of comparison, in 2013 the United States has a score of .89, the United Kingdom: 
.86; Switzerland: .84; and Norway: .91. 
It is thought that the lack of education in West Africa has contributed to the 
spread of the outbreak, particularly with respect to the unwilingness to heed the warnings 
by the government and international aid organizations about the seriousness of Ebola, the 
imperative of seeking care, the adherence to protection measures, and behavior 
modifications that could prevent transmission (226). 
 
 
Education Index: Calculated using mean years and expected years of schooling 
 
 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013 
Guinea     0.253 0.2861 0.29445 
Liberia 0.1703 0.2644 0.3121 0.344 0.349 0.3672 0.3672 
Siera 
Leone  
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Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). MPI is an index of poverty that uses a 
multidimensional model to measure the number of deprivations with which poor 
households typicaly contend (source: htp:/hdr.undp.org/en/content/multidimensional-
poverty-index-mpi). 
A person is considered poor if they are deprived in at least a third of the weighted 
indicators and the folowing ten indicators are used to produce the measurement (source: 
htp:/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multidimensional_Poverty_Index): 
 
1. Years of schooling: deprived if no household member has completed five years of 
schooling. 
2. Child school atendance: deprived if any school-aged child is not atending 
school. 
3. Child mortality: deprived if any child has died in the family. 
4. Nutrition: deprived if any adult or child is malnourished. 
5. Electricity: deprived if the household has no electricity. 
6. Sanitation: deprived if the household’s sanitation facility is not improved 
(according to UN Milennium Development Goals guidelines), or it is improved 
but shared with other households 
7. Drinking water: deprived if the household does not have access to safe drinking 
water or safe drinking water is more than a 30-minute walk from home round trip. 
8. Floor: deprived if the household has a dirt, sand or dung floor. 
9. Cooking fuel: deprived if the household cooks with dung, wood or charcoal. 
10. Assets ownership: deprived if the household does not own more than one radio, 
TV, telephone, bike, motorbike or refrigerator and does not own a car or truck. 
 
The intensity of poverty denotes the proportion of indicators in which they are deprived. 
For example in Liberia, those who are poor sufer from deprivation in 81.9 % of the 
indicators. In Guinea, the por sufer from deprivation in 86.5 % of the indicators and in 
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5. Broken Chains of Containment Protocols Containment of Ebola is an intense 
process that is dependent upon sound epidemiologic surveilance measures, which in turn 
rely on a large investment in human capital to work properly. Containment protocols 
exist in a continuous loop: infected patients and suspected cases must be isolated in a 
proper facility; there must be a methodical and consistent process to trace and monitor 
every single contact of every single case for 21 days; contact tracers should be trained to 
recognize and measure Ebola symptoms in contacts; al suspected and probable cases 
found among the contacts who are traced need to have their medical condition properly 
assessed and their disease status confirmed by rapid laboratory tests; and finaly, al 
confirmed infected contacts must be isolated in a treatment center and every single one of 
their contacts must be monitored for 21 days. With every new case detected amongst the 
contacts, the cycle must be activated once again (220). 
 This cycle of surveilance is impossible if cases are being un-reported. By 
definition, these unrecorded cases include unrecorded contacts (4; 173; 221). Any breach 
in any part of the chain of surveilance can exacerbate the epidemic: a single missed case 
or a single missed contact who contracts the disease can start another chain of 
transmission (223). The integrity of the relationship between epidemiologists and Ebola 
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patients and their contacts must be preserved to stop an Ebola epidemic and this balance 
is dependent upon a functioning outbreak control system. 
The reality is that outbreak protocol and the containment systems necessary to 
control an Ebola epidemic did not exist in West Africa. In a Perspective column in the 
New England Journal of Medicine, a nurse working at an Ebola Treatment Center in 
Kailahun, Siera Leone reports that 250 contacts identified were identified in one week, 
but given the number of confirmed cases, there should have been closer to 1500 contacts 
(222). 
Of the Ebola patients that were accounted for, the task of folowing up their 
contacts was a monumental one (4; 173, 174; 221). Many contact tracers reported evasion 
on the part of contacts, some of whom ran away or hid for fear of being taken into an 
Ebola Treatment Center. There were logistical dificulties in finding contacts, 
particularly in rural areas where some tracers were known to hike hours in very dificult 
terain to find contacts. Some contacts were hostile, angry and flat out denied that they 
had interactions with a sick person. Many refused to give their names or to comply with 
self-enforced quarantine. Contact tracing in densely populated slums and urban centers 
was chalenging. It was nearly impossible to determine how many contacts one patient 
had in a community where everything is shared, including matresses, toilets, living 
quarters, and caring for children and for the sick (195). 
‘Of the grid’ cases and incomplete contact tracing is thought to be the reason 
why the outbreak was initialy thought to have burned out in April and May, 2014 only to 
reemerge more vigorously in the early summer (3). Clusters of undocumented cases were 
brewing in rural areas, out of the reach of epidemiologic surveilance. It is believed that 
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infection in these hidden areas reached critical mass until, eventualy and inevitably, an 
infected patient from these unknown clusters had contact with someone in the community 
or with someone who would make his or her way into an urban center. Once the virus 
reemerged in May, it proved impossible to stop. 
 
6. Safe and Proper Burial Since the beginning of the outbreak, removal and proper 
burial of the dead has been a source of controversy. West Africans hold funeral rite 
sacred and had a dificult time abandoning them despite the fact that traditional burial 
practices pose a great risk of viral transmission. Tradition dictates that after death bodies 
are kept in the home for several days or weeks, during which time they are washed and 
prepared for burial. The post mortem viral titers in the bodily fluids and blood of a 
deceased Ebola patient remain high and provide an opportunity for the virus to be 
transmited to those who care for the body. During the wake, it is customary for mourners 
to touch and kiss the deceased before they are buried posing a risk of transmission to al 
of the mourners. Some often travel great distances to atend and when they return home, 
they take the virus with them (226; 228; 230). 
The actual transport of bodies themselves back to home cities or districts for 
traditional burial ceremonies also opens up another avenue for transmission. Families are 
known to frequently transport dead bodies themselves without proper protection in order 
to organize funerals in other towns, opening up avenues of transmission to those who 
provide the transportation and help move the bodies (227). The most publicized 
occurence was the case of the Imam in Mali in November who died in Mali but was 
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transported back to Guinea for his funeral, from which over 300 contacts were identified 
(232). 
Because of the high risk of transmission associated with customary funeral 
practices, in August, Liberian president Elen Johnson Sirleaf decreed that al bodies of 
Ebola victims in Monrovia be cremated in an efort to curtail funeral transmission (229). 
However, this ruling has unintended consequences: shortly after it was made more than 
half of the beds at Ebola Treatment Centers were found empty, despite the fact that this 
was a time of intense transmission and high incidence of Ebola cases. Instead of obeying 
the mandate, families were electing to care Ebola patients at home instead of seeking 
treatment at Ebola Treatment Centers, which amplified the cycle of transmission (228). 
Burials in Liberia are not alowed without a death certificate confirming a non-Ebola 
death, therefore when the sick eventualy died, family members went so far as to bribe 
Ebola response teams for death certificate or to turn a blind eye as they caried out 
traditional funeral and burial rites in secret (230). It is also possible that these bribes were 
ofered so families could avoid the stigma of having to admit a family member died of 
Ebola.  
Outside of Monrovia, the rest of Liberia was not required to cremate the bodies of 
Ebola victims, but they were obliged to ensure that bodies were buried safely to eliminate 
the possibility of transmission. Guidelines issued by the Center for Disease Control caled 
for the bodies to be handled only by those trained in the removal of infected human 
remains; to be wrapped in plastic shrouds; and buried in hermeticaly sealed caskets (231; 
228). However, many of these bodies were intered in mass unmarked graves, even 
though this was in violation of the safe and dignified burial standard operating procedure. 
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Family members should have been alowed the opportunity to observe the burial of a 
loved one, but were denied that right. As a result, families stil hid and cared for Ebola 
patients at home and buried them in secret according to their tradition (228; 229). 
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Conclusion 
As Ebola transmission begins to decline in West Africa, it is necessary to look to 
the future and put systems in place that wil prepare the region in the investigation and 
control of emerging infections. The Human Development and Multidimensional Poverty 
Indices of al three countries in West Africa indicate that people are living in conditions 
that are extraordinarily deprived. The majority of the population is poor, malnourished, 
and live without proper sanitation, al circumstances that leave them susceptible to 
disease, both endemic and epidemic. Corrective measures and new systems should 
include lessons learned from the curent Ebola outbreak. 
The health care infrastructure in Liberia, Guinea and Siera Leone remains weak 
and inadequate. After decades of civil unrest, the region was only beginning to 
reestablish health systems and to see marginal improvements in some reported health 
indicators, but these populations remain vulnerable to other health crises. Incident 
tuberculosis has been rising gradualy since 1990 in Siera Leone and Liberia, and these 
patients wil most likely not receive routine care or medicines. While the reported 
maternal and infant mortality rates have declined since 1990, whether they are 
undereported or not, they are stil among the highest in the world. After Ebola left health 
systems decimated, many pregnant women don’t have a professional to see if they 
experience complications (248). Childhood immunization rates have been steadily 
increasing, but they are stil much lower than in the developed world, and fal short of the 
percentage necessary for herd immunity. In particular there is concern that lapses over the 
past year in measles vaccination campaigns have left the country susceptible to a measles 
outbreak, which could cause death rates on par with the Ebola epidemic itself (247).  
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In addition to concerns about routine health measures, Ebola has iluminated the 
necessity for rebuilding infrastructures and constructing emergency systems that can be 
activated in the event of another health emergency. While the proportion of GDP that has 
been spent on health care infrastructures in Liberia and Siera Leone has increased over 
the past decade (Guinea continues to spend the least of the three countries, dedicating less 
than 10% of GDP to health care infrastructures), any gains that were made have been 
destroyed over the past year. Basic systems need to be rebuilt, such as opening more 
hospitals and equipping them with basic infection control supplies, such as medications, 
gloves, disinfectants, and masks: materials that were reported to be unavailable when 
Ebola struck.  
There also needs to be an active surveilance system put into place that is stafed 
with wel-trained professionals who can be sent to the field when an outbreak occurs. 
Epidemiologists and medical teams need to be ready to be dispatched to identify cases. 
Primary health care facilities and laboratories must be built for beter diagnoses and 
clinical management. Once cases are identified and reported, contact tracers need to be 
activated immediately to find potential cases. While such a system wil require significant 
financial outlays, the infrastructure, once in place, wil be a useful, life-saving 
investment. There are endemic diseases in West Africa, such as Lassa fever, yelow 
fever, meningitis, malaria, and cholera that can be contained by such a system. A measles 
vaccination campaign could also be expedited by the structure that this system could 
provide.   
The swift action that contained the virus in Nigeria as wel as in the Firestone 
Plantation in Liberia are prime examples of how Ebola in an urban seting does not have 
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to end with a high case fatality rate. Nigeria had the polio eradication program 
infrastructure in place to facilitate Ebola control measures, which expedited the Ebola 
surveilance and containment process. At the Firestone Plantation, as soon as the first 
case arived in late March/early April 2014, the company activated the existing 
organizational framework and redirected resources to contain the outbreak using standard 
measures such as active and passive surveilance, case identification, and proper infection 
control procedures. The same type of infrastructure can be built and maintained in West 
Africa, but financial resources must be directed to the area. 
Human capital is equaly as imperative. Before the outbreak, there was a dearth of 
doctors and nurses and those who remained often went on strike over salary issues and 
other demands (those strikes and demands continued throughout the outbreak amongst 
doctors, nurses, contact tracers, and ambulance drivers, and burial teams). Ebola has 
decreased the number of health care providers even further. As of March 25, 2015, there 
have been 853 health care workers who were diagnosed with Ebola and 494 of them have 
died.  
It is necessary to replenish the health care cadre in West Africa by exploring other 
training approaches. For example, the method of doctor training and education that exists 
in Cuba might serve as model to folow. In 1998, the Cuban government established the 
Latin American Medical School, which gives scholarships to low income students around 
the world and provides them with an education (249). The understanding of the program 
is that upon completion of their training, doctors wil return to their home countries to 
practice medicine. As of 2014, more than 23,000 physicians have graduated from the 
program. With seed money from the global health community, this type of scholarship 
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program for West African medical students could provide the region with the doctor pool 
it needs to help support a newly rebuilt health care infrastructure. It would incentivize 
education and bring much needed medical personnel to the area.  
Ebola, and indeed many other outbreaks, are fought and overcome on the vilage 
level, but this latest outbreak has shown that disease can spread exponentialy, and 
outbreaks seemingly never end, without trust in public health messages and adherence to 
containment protocols. Good communication and community engagement are vital to 
“combat denial, rumors, and behaviors that can fan new transmission chains” (194). To 
that end, community and religious leaders are a necessary component of the surveilance 
and communication. It is imperative to bring al local and grass roots leaders into the 
fold and encourage their participation in surveilance and delivering containment 
messages. This fosters trust in the community and can help emergency response systems 
work more eficiently.  
Ebola outbreaks in the past have heretofore been elusive and abbreviated, leaving 
researchers with very litle scientific evidence they can use to study the virus. The 2014 
outbreak has provided a large number of cases and survivors to alow the scientific 
community the opportunity to examine the risk factors for death and short and long-term 
outcomes. There is now more information about the potential positive efects on patients 
who receive oral rehydration therapy. While the efect of the treatment has not been 
studied in a randomized and controled environment, enough anecdotal evidence has been 
gathered that educated hypotheses can be formed. This may be helpful in the clinical 
management of future Ebola outbreaks and could save lives. 
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Vaccine and other clinical trials have been rapidly roled out over the past year 
and wel-powered studies are now possible given the case loads in West Africa. While 
the development of the drug Brincidofovir has been abandoned by Chimerix and the 
Faviporavir trials revealed that more research on the drugs efectiveness is needed, there 
are curently trials underway that are studying the efectiveness of ZMapp, blood/plasma 
therapy, and TKM-Ebola.  
The development of a safe and efective vaccine could give health care workers 
and other front line responders the protection they need to keep themselves safe and to 
administer more comprehensive care in the early days of an epidemic. Early results from 
the chimp adenovirus vector vaccine showed safety and immunogenicity, and Phase I 
and Phase II clinical trials are being run at the time of this writing in West Africa.  
Only time and more studies wil tel if an efective therapy or vaccine can be 
developed. The concern going forward is that after the last of the Ebola patients have 
been buried or return home, the scientific community wil move on to something else, 
Ebola therapeutics wil be deprioritized, and al gains wil be abandoned. As populations 
continue to grow and more and more people move to urban areas seeking economic 
opportunity (5), the likelihood of Ebola resurfacing in a densely populated city is likely. 
The outbreak of 2014 has shown us that Ebola, or indeed any other ‘rare’ disease, can 
quickly spread, take thousands of lives, destroy communities, and become a global threat.  
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